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This article explores three new concepts in property law. First, the article
defines an emerging property form - virtual property - that is not intellectual
property, but that more efficiently governs rivalrous, persistent, and
interconnected online resources. Second, the article demonstrates that the
threat to high-value uses of internet resources is not the traditional tragedy of
the commons that results in overuse. Rather, the naturally layered nature of
the internet leads to overlapping rights of exclusion that cause underuse of
internet resources: a tragedy of the anticommons. And finally, the article
shows that the common law of property can act to limit the costs of this
internet anticommons.
INTRODUCTION
Should computer code that is designed to act like real world property be
regulated and protected like real world property? This article contends that it
should.
Much computer code is just one step removed from a pure idea. It is non-
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rivalrous; that is, one person's use of the code does not stop another person
from using it. This kind of code is, correctly, protected by the law of
intellectual property.' Intellectual property protects the creative interest in
non-rivalrous resources. If intellectual property did not exist, creators would
not be able to recoup the costs of creation.
2
But there is another kind of code, rarely discussed in the technical or legal
literature. This kind of code is designed to act more like land or chattel than
ideas. It pervades the internet and comprises many of the most important
online resources. Often, this kind of code makes up the structural components
of the internet itself. Domain names, URLs (uniform resource locators),
websites, email accounts, and entire virtual worlds are all examples of this
second type of code. They are rivalrous. 3 If one person owns and controls
them, others do not. They are persistent. Unlike the software on your
computer, they do not go away when you turn your computer off. And they
I See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 122-41 (1999)
(discussing intellectual property as a means of controlling code by law); Julie E. Cohen &
Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1,
18-20 (2001) (discussing the impact of patent protection on software development); Michael
Geist, Cyberlaw 2.0; 44 B.C. L. REv. 323, 335-38 (2003) (discussing the expansion of
control over code in part by the expansion of copyright doctrine); Dennis S. Karijala,
Copyright Protection of Computer Program Structure, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 519, 525-30
(1998) (discussing the evolution of intellectual property protection for software); Maureen
A. O'Rourke, Legislative Inaction on the Information Superhighway: Bargaining in the
Shadow of Copyright Law, 3 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 193, 195-96 (1997) (discussing the
expansion of copyright doctrine in regulating software code); Bradford Smith & Susan 0.
Mann, Innovation and Intellectual Property Protection in the Software Industry: An
Emerging Role for Patents?, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 241, 242-44 (2004) (discussing the impact
of patent protection on software development).
2 As Richard Posner observed:
Intellectual property is characterized by heavy fixed costs relative to marginal costs. It
is often very expensive to create, but once it is created the cost of making additional
copies is low, dramatically so in the case of software, where it is only a slight
overstatement to speak of marginal cost as zero. Without legal protection, the creator
of intellectual property may be unable to recoup his investment, because competitors
can free-ide on it; and so legal protection can expand output rather than, as in the usual
case of monopoly, reduce it.
Richard Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy 3 (U. Chi., John M. Olin Law & Economics
Working Paper No. 106, 2000), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmt?abstract-id=249316.
3 It is important not to confuse rivalrousness of consumption (the fact that one actor's use
of a resource bars others from use as a consequence) with exclusivity. Exclusivity is a
function of rivalrousness. Many resources, including purely non-rivalrous resources, can be
protected by exclusionary rules - for example, the Recording Industry Association of
America has attempted to use exclusionary rules to protect its non-rivalrous music. But
where a resource is rivalrous, exclusion costs drop significantly. Thus, to the extent that this
article discusses exclusionary rights, it does so precisely because exclusionary rights are so
much less expensive when used to protect rivalrous resources.
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are interconnected.4 Other people can interact with them. This kind of code I
term "virtual property." 5
There is, however, a problem. In general, we continue to govern virtual
property through the law of intellectual property.6 Even where there has been
some recognition that virtual property is somehow "different," no clear
articulation of that difference has been offered. As a result, holders of
intellectual property rights have been systematically eliminating emerging
virtual property rights by the use of contracts called End User License
Agreements ("EULAs"). 7 Despite (or perhaps because of) these contracts, no
distinct protection for property rights in virtual property has appeared in the
United States, even though millions of people and billions of dollars are
involved in gray-market transactions in such property.8 In comparison, China,
Taiwan, and Korea have already made significant steps toward protecting
ownership interests in virtual property, hoping to attract the burgeoning
industry of virtual worlds.9
Why is it important that we have a theory of virtual property? The common
law of property works to ensure that resources are used well.' 0 If we do not
have a good theory of virtual property, then virtual property will be poorly
used. For example, a key step in the development of the internet was the
adoption of a property-style regime in the form of the International
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"), an organization
that acts as a recording system for internet addresses." Property law also
I I use the term "interconnected" to cover both the concept of location within a network
(and thus susceptibility to network effects) and the concept of interactivity. It is certainly
possible for a resource to be networked and not interactive; likewise, it is possible for a
resource to be interactive and not networked - a single-user resource meets the interactivity
criterion, but is not accessible to second and third order parties. "Interconnectivity" as I use
it here covers both of these concepts.
I Although the industry that makes virtual worlds has previously used the term "virtual
property" to refer to property-like objects (virtual houses, virtual cars, and other virtual
objects) within virtual worlds, I include more resources within the definition than is
generally the practice. The relevant characteristics of rivalrousness, persistence, and
interconnectivity appear in numerous online resources (email addresses and URLs, for
example); these characteristics should therefore be included in the definition.
6 More precisely, virtual property is governed under a regime where initial rights are
allocated to intellectual property holders, and subsequent rights are governed by license
agreements (called EULAs, or End User License Agreements). See infra Part IV.C.
' See id.
8 See Edward Castronova, Virtual Worlds: A First-Hand Account of Market and Society
on the Cyberian Frontier 4 (CESifo Working Paper Series, Paper No. 618, 2001), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract 294828.
9 See infra Part IV.D.
o See infra Part III.
See Kenton K. Yee, Location. Location.Location: Internet Addresses as Evolving
Property, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 201, 203-10 (1997).
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lowers search costs associated with the sale of resources by permitting a
limited number of property forms that are easier to search.12 For example, a
title search on a house is less expensive because there are a fixed and limited
set of ways in which the house could be encumbered. Similarly, property law
lowers negotiation costs by limiting fragmentation of property rights.13 To
give an example of fragmentation, if property rights in a tractor were split such
that one person owned the wheels while another owned the chassis, you would
have to negotiate with both people to be able to use the tractor as a whole,
which would be more expensive. Thus, a theory of virtual property is critical
to ensure efficient use of internet resources, lower search costs, and reduce
negotiation costs that would otherwise prevent the flow of high-value
resources to high-value uses. 14
A good theory of virtual property is also important to the future of the
internet. If we protect virtual property, the internet could become a three-
dimensional global virtual environment. The possibilities for medical,
commercial, social, military, artistic, and cultural advancement offered by such
a virtual environment have just begun to be explored. 15 Thus, we should care
about the protection of virtual property not only because markets already value
it immensely, but because we will all come to value it more due to the potential
it offers for societal advancement.
Finally, a theory of virtual property is important to maintain the equilibrium
of the law as it adapts to new contexts. 16 The common law is a complex
system that has evolved over time to encode many different factors into its
rules. In particular, the law of contract and the law of property traditionally
balance each other. The law of contract permits parties to realize the value of
idiosyncratic preferences through trades. The law of property traditionally
limits the burdens 17 that parties may place on the productive use or
12 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 26-34 (2000); see also infra
Part III.C.2.
13 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 640-42 (1998); see also infra Part III.C.1.
14 See infra Part III.
15 See infra Part II.B.
16 In addition to this equilibrium function, the law of property itself risks becoming
moribund if it is cut off from being considered in the numerous cases of first impression
concerning online resources. If property law is restricted to land and physical objects, it will
be of decreasing usefulness as intangible assets and resources continue to increase in
importance. More importantly, law develops where disputes form and rights emerge. In the
common law system, law grows (in part) from cases, especially cases of first impression. If
a legal discipline is excluded from consideration in cases of first impression, it will not
grow. See Caroline Bradley & Michael Froomkin, Virtual Worlds, Real Rules, 49 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 103, 103 (2005) ("In virtual worlds.., the Internet may accidentally provide
an environment that lends itself well to the testing of legal rules.").
17 Specifically, idiosyncratic contractual burdens on property can raise search costs for
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marketability of high-value resources by means of contract.18 For example,
unreasonable contractual restraints on alienation are eliminated by the law of
property. 19 But currently in the context of the internet, we have imported the
common law of contract wholesale, without the counterbalance of property
law. As a result, emergent useful property forms are being eliminated by
contract. 20
This article will therefore set forth a theory of virtual property, will
demonstrate the relevance of the common law of property to cyberspace, and
will address challenges to the model of virtual property. Part I defines virtual
property in more depth, and gives examples of virtual property as it currently
exists, as well as examples of important emerging forms of virtual property.
Part II examines whether the common law of property can have any relevance
to the realm of cyberspace. Part III draws the threads together, and
demonstrates how property law can encourage growth and limit stagnation in
use of online resources. Part IV addresses some common criticisms of the
theory of virtual property from the perspectives of economics, law, and the
technology industry.
I. WHAT IS VIRTUAL PROPERTY?
The "space" in cyberspace refers to something in particular: the
rivalrousness, or "spatial" nature, of certain internet resources, like URLs,
domain names, email accounts, virtual worlds, and more. We use the term
cyberspace not because we are bad analogists,21 but because many online
third-party purchasers. If I want to buy a house, I know that real property can be burdened
with only a limited set of recorded easements and covenants. If, however, idiosyncratic
burdens on property are enforced with respect to any house, then purchasers of any other
house must spend extra time and money making sure that no strange contractual burdens
inhibit the use of the property they want to buy. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 12, at 26-
27. In addition, the fragmentation of property rights among numerous different rights-
holders can cause negotiation costs to rise: if I want to buy a car, but one person owns the
wheels, while another owns the car body, I must negotiate with both parties, which raises
my costs, and creates opportunities for the parties to extract. See Heller, supra note 13, at
622.
18 To give three brief examples of how property law restrains contract: property law
eliminates unreasonable restraints on alienation, limits the fragmentary effects of dead-hand
control (through rules like the Rule Against Perpetuities), and does not enforce novel
contractual burdens on property (termed "fancies"). See Merrill & Smith, supra note 12, at
27-29.
19 Id. at 24-25.
20 See infra Part IV.
21 For a selection of scholarship rejecting the space analogy, see, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith,
Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1199, 1200-05 (1998); Joseph H. Sommer,
Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1190-92 (2000); Maureen O'Rourke,
Property Rights and Competition on the Internet: In Search of an Appropriate Analogy, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 561, 600 (2001); Timothy Wu, When Law & the Internet First Met, 3
1052 [Vol. 85:1047
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resources mimic physical properties. For example, a chat room is, in many
ways, similar to a conference room; a URL is similar to real estate in the real
world. This type of code is ubiquitous and important.22 It forms much of the
structure of the internet. This section will define virtual property, discuss
several examples of it, and show how virtual property is evolving.
A. Virtual Property is Rivalrous, Persistent, and Interconnected Code that
Mimics Real World Characteristics
Virtual property shares three legally relevant characteristics with real world
property: rivalrousness, persistence, and interconnectivity. Based on these
shared characteristics, subsequent sections will show that virtual property
should be treated like real world property under the law.
Much code is designed to act as a purely non-rivalrous resource. One
person's use of the code does not impede another person from making use of it.
Non-rivalrousness enables the creation and distribution of many perfect copies
at nearly zero cost. 23 The non-rivalrousness of code is the novelty of the
internet that has most captured the legal and public imagination, in the form of
lawsuits against music and movie downloaders and producers of filesharing
software, for example. 24
But not all code is non-rivalrous. Rivalrousness, in the physical world, lets
the owner exclude other people from using owned objects.25 We often desire
GREEN BAG 171, 172 (2000) ("Then came history. The metaphor of place did not exactly
stand the test of time."). To the extent academics have approved of place language
describing online resources, they have done so out of a sense of psychological utility, not a
sense that the language is descriptively accurate. See Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or
Feudal Society?: Metaphors and Perceptions of Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1207,
1210 (2002) ("Of the many metaphors that have been applied to the Internet, the most
prominent and influential has been the imagination of the Internet as a separate, new
physical space known as 'cyberspace,' and its comparison to America's Western Frontier.").
22 1 use the term code to include both data, and the operations of software on that data.
As discussed below, property law is concerned with the proper packaging of property rights
so that they will flow to high-value uses. Splitting code into data (that which is operated
upon) and engine (that which does the operating) does not package code at a useful level.
For example, it is the combination of data (say, a URL, or the data that resides on the
computer the URL designates) and engine (the software that runs Domain Name Servers
and the protocols that route users to a specific site) that creates the real-world characteristics
in code that I describe here. For property purposes, splitting data and code makes as much
sense as splitting the engine and wheels from a tractor - the tractor functions at the level of
the whole.
23 See Posner, supra note 2, at 3.
24 See, e.g., MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005); In re Aimster
Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 651 (7th Cir. 2003).
25 For an analysis of the right to exclude in physical property, see Thomas W. Merrill,
Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REv. 730, 730 (1998) (stating that "the right
to exclude others is... the sine qua non" of property rights) (emphasis added).
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the power to exclude in cyberspace too, and so we design that power into code.
By design, we make code that can only be possessed by one person. Thus,
rivalrousness exists also in code. If one person controls rivalrous code, nobody
else does. For example, no one but the owner of an internet address (or those
the owner permits) can post content to that address. If person A owns a given
internet address, person B cannot put her website up at that address. If one
person has a given email address, nobody else can receive mail at that same
address.
There are other characteristics drawn from the physical world that are
incorporated into code as well. Objects and places in the physical world are
persistent. For example, a statue need only be sculpted once. After that, it
remains in the city square for hundreds of years. Similarly, code is often made
persistent - that is, it does not fade after each use, and it does not run on one
single computer. For example, an email account can be accessed from a
laptop, a desktop, or the local library. When an email account owner turns her
laptop off, the information in that account does not cease to exist. It persists on
the server of her Internet Service Provider.2 6
Objects in the real world are also naturally interconnected. Two people in
the same room experience exactly the same objects. Objects in the real world
can affect each other, by the laws of physics. Similarly, code can be made
interconnected, so that although one person may control it, others may
experience it. The value of a URL or an email address is not solely that the
owner can control it; the value is that other people can connect to it, and can
experience it. They may not be able to control it without the owner's
permission, but - as with real estate in the real world - with the owner's
invitation they may interact with it.
To recap: these traits - rivalrousness, persistence, and interconnectivity -
mimic real world properties. If I hold a pen, I have it and you don't.
Rivalrousness. If I put the pen down and leave the room, it is still there. That
is persistence. And finally, you can all interact with the pen - with my
permission, you can experience it. That is interconnectivity. Why is code
trying so hard to mimic these properties? Rivalrousness gives me the ability to
invest in my property without fear that other people may take what I have
built.27  Persistence protects my investment by ensuring that it lasts.
26 The trait of persistence is linked to a technological phenomenon that will have greater
importance in the discussion that follows. The trait of persistence is achieved through
distributed computing - that is, the code runs on multiple computers simultaneously. A
common form is that code is split between a client program that runs locally, and a server
that manages coordination between other interconnected accounts. Thus, for example, your
email client may run on your local laptop, and receive its information from your Internet
Service Provider's server, where the information is stored.
27 Additionally, rivalrousness lowers monitoring and detection costs for protecting
property. Whereas in commons property misuse is quite hard to police (because the misuser
is entitled to be on the property and make some use of it), interference with rivalrous private
property is very easy to detect. For example, if you take my pen from me, I will detect the
[Vol. 85:10471054
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Interconnectivity increases the value of the property due to network effects -
not least of which is the fact that other people's experience of my resource may
be such that it becomes desirable, and hence marketable, to them.
To clarify this discussion, we turn to several examples of virtual property -
rivalrous, persistent, and interconnected code - as it currently exists.
B. Examples of Virtual Property
A URL (uniform resource locator) is a good starting example. A URL is an
internet address consisting of an access protocol (e.g., http), a domain name
(www.microsoft.com), and occasional additional information. There is no
particular creative value associated with creating a URL. But it undoubtedly
has value.28 It is a piece of internet real estate. A URL is rivalrous, persistent,
and interconnected. Because it is rivalrous, the owner of a URL can exclude
other people from posting content to that URL. 29 Independent of the right of
exclusion, only one website can exist at a given address. Because it is
persistent and interconnected, other people can interact with the content posted
to the URL without vitiating the owner's interest in it.30
Email accounts are another example. Email accounts are rivalrous - no two
people can have the same address. They are persistent - unless the owner of
the account deletes the information, it will continue to be stored on the service
provider's server. And they are interconnected - the entire value of an email
account (as well as its vulnerability) is that anyone who has or guesses an
loss fairly quickly. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315,
1327 (1993).
28 Indeed, the phenomenon of the speculative value of intemet addresses is well
documented. See, e.g., Yee, supra note 11, at 206-10.
29 Absent a hack. Like all property systems, the one I describe here is subject to theft.
The fact that someone may steal my pocketwatch does not, however, vitiate my ownership
interest in it.
30 An immediate objection to my formulation here might be that URLs are more similar
to trademark - archetypal IP - than real property. The connection is only strengthened by
the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114, 1125(a) (2000), which
allows courts to reassign URLs to trademark holders if the prior registrant was not making
good-faith use of the site. But there the resemblance ends. Real world property is marked
by low monitoring and exclusion costs - trespassers are easily identified, and self-help
exclusion (like fencing around a plot of land) is comparatively cheap. Intellectual property
suffers from high monitoring costs, and self-help is not an option. A trademark holder
cannot exclude other people from using the trademark - he can merely ask a court to do so
on a person-by-person basis. But a URL owner benefits from the same low monitoring
costs that a real property owner does. The only way to take over a URL is to hack it -
which is immediately detectable, unlike infringing trademark use. Further, the same self-
help remedies are available to the owner of a URL that are available to the owner of real
property: fencing by password protection would be only one example. Thus, in terms of
monitoring, detection, and exclusion costs, URLs are much more like real world property
than trademarks.
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address can communicate with it. It is true that email accounts are not like
physical property in many respects. But it is also true that we treat them quite
differently than we do software licenses. Email accounts are personal spaces.
31
They are alternate identities. They are unique to us. Law has begun to respond
to this shared sense that an email address is something more than a routine
license. For example, legislation and case law dealing with spam email
attempt to enforce a right to not be contacted. 32 That is a right that derives
from being contacted on or through one's property. No corresponding right to
refuse unwanted contact obtains in public places. 33
The question of whether online accounts are property has immediate
relevance. A growing dispute is forming over who owns the online accounts
of deceased soldiers in the Iraq war.34 The families of soldiers claim that the
accounts - which often contain pictures and journals - are the property of the
decedent's estate. 35 The ISPs claim that the accounts cannot be released for
privacy reasons - if property claims are able to touch online accounts, ISPs
assert, the value of privacy that people find valuable in such accounts will be
eliminated.36 Whether the accounts constitute property or not will drive how
they are treated in probate, whether they are devisable, and whether they are
alienable.
The virtual property phenomenon is not limited to accounts. Websites also
mimic characteristics of physical space. 37 Think of the internet as a spider web
of connections. The relative position of websites to one another is intangible,
but also non-duplicable and absolutely rivalrous. For example, Amazon.com
maintains a salesperson program, whereby individuals may create links from
their personal homepages to books sold by Amazon. 38 Whenever a book is
sold by someone who traveled through the link, the person who maintains the
personal page receives a commission. Thus, Amazon's position within the
31 For an extended treatment of the argument that personal connection justifies a property
interest, see Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957, 958
(1982).
32 See, e.g., CAN-SPAM Act, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 [hereinafter CAN-
SPAM] (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (2000 & Supp. 2004).
33 See Nicole B. Casarez, Public Forums, Selective Subsidies, and Shifting Standards of
Viewpoint Discrimination, 64 ALB. L. REv. 501, 505-20 (2000) (describing the history and
development of public forum doctrine).
" See Ariana Eunjung Chung, After Death, Fight for Digital Memories, WASH. POST,
Feb. 3, 2005, at Al.
" See id. ("As computers continue to permeate our lives, what happens to digital bits of
information when their owners die has become one of the vexing questions of the intemet
age.").
36 See id.
37 See Yee, supra note 11, at 10.
38 For the Amazon Associates program, see Amazon.com,
http://www.amazon.com/gp/browse.html/ref-gwbtas/002-2103927-
6536853?node=3435371 (last visited Sept. 11, 2005) (on file with author).
1056 [Vol. 85:1047
VIRTUAL PROPERTY
spider web of electronic connections is immensely valuable. 39 It is also
rivalrous, persistent, and interconnected. In the Amazon example, it is its
location within a network of links that gives Amazon's website the
characteristics of virtual property.
Another commonly occurring example of virtual property is a chat room
devoted to discussing stocks. There is a focusing effect that draws people to
the chat room - the more people that are involved in the conversation, the more
valuable the discussion becomes. You cannot take over the chat room from its
creator, so it is rivalrous.40 But people can join the conversation because of the
interconnectivity and persistent traits of the space, just as they might go to a
restaurant where stockbrokers are known to meet. There is a reason we call it
a chat "room," entirely divorced from the pseudopsychological sense of being
in a space: the space may be electronic, but it has encoded into it some of the
characteristics of a real room.
Virtual property also plays an important part in financial institutions - a
bank account may be one of the earliest forms of virtual property.41 Bank
accounts exist as loci within an interconnected network. The owner of an
account has an exclusionary right over a nexus of electronic credits and debits
located at that nexus. The bank account is persistent - even though the account
balance is merely an entry, that entry remains in the bank if undisturbed. The
bank account is interconnected - other people can send money to the account,
and the owner of the account can authorize money to flow to other account
holders.
The development of virtual property as a concept also makes possible useful
secured transactions.42 Possession, under the Uniform Commercial Code, is a
cheap way of establishing a relationship with an interest that is quickly and
commonly traded.43 The law therefore has set forth technological requirements
31 Indeed, Amazon obtained patent protection for its referral program. See Mo Krochmal
& Jason Coombs, Amazon Associates Plan Wins Patent Protection, TECHWEB, Feb. 25,
2000, http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/TWB20000225 S00 13.
'0 You could hack the chat room, of course, but that hack would be immediately clear to
the owner of the chatroom. Further, self-help (in the form of password controls) is available
to the creator of the chat room. So the exclusion costs (including monitoring, detection, and
protection costs) of a chat room are lower than they are in the case of intellectual (non-
ivalrous) property. A chat room falls nearer to real property, which can be protected by
fences and cheaply monitored for misuse, than it does to intellectual property, for which
exclusion costs are quite high and enforcement available only through the courts.
41 It is necessary to recognize that bank accounts are already tightly regulated. I am by
no means suggesting that common law rules ought to supplant this banking regime; I am
merely pointing out one of the oldest "intangibles" that shares the traits of rivalrousness,
persistence, and interconnectivity discussed here.
42 See, e.g., Jane K. Winn, Electronic Chattel Paper Under Revised Article 9: Updating
the Concept of Embodied Rights for Electronic Commerce, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1055,
1061-62 (1999).
41 See, e.g., U.C.C. Revised art. 9 (2001) (describing rules governing perfection of chattel
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that describe an infrastructure under which electronic chattel paper may be
meaningfully "possessed" for perfection purposes.44 The relevant attributes of
this electronic chattel paper are that it must be capable of being possessed by
one person only, it must persist (since the value it represents must be
maintained), and it must be able to be freely traded to other people who
themselves can cheaply establish rights of possession. 45 Electronic chattel
paper therefore is rivalrous, persistent, and interconnected - and thus virtual
property.
These examples are necessarily limited, and critics can likely think of
reasons to exclude one or another example. What is important to draw from
the above examples is that certain kinds of code are designed to act like real
world objects. When a design decision has been made to make code act like
real world objects, the question is whether the law ought to enable or ignore
this fact. It is that question we must bear in mind as we examine the future of
virtual property: virtual environments.
C. The Future of Virtual Property: Virtual Environments
Thus far we have seen that rivalrous, persistent, and interconnected code,
called virtual property, already comprises a large section of important online
resources - URLs, domain names, email addresses, websites, chat rooms, and
more. But that is only the tip of the iceberg. Virtual environments - fully
three-dimensional virtual versions of the real world - are an exploding
phenomenon, with tens of millions of users worldwide, encompassing trade
worth billions of dollars. 46
paper by possession).
44 UCC Revised § 9-105 (2001), entitled "Control of Electronic Chattel Paper," states:
A secured party has control of electronic chattel paper if the record or records
comprising the chattel paper are created, stored, and assigned in such a manner that:
(1) a single authoritative copy of the record or records exists which is unique,
identifiable and, except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (4), (5), and (6),
unalterable;
(2) the authoritative copy identifies the secured party as the assignee of the record or
records;
(3) the authoritative copy is communicated to and maintained by the secured party or
its designated custodian;
(4) copies or revisions that add or change an identified assignee of the authoritative
copy can be made only with the participation of the secured party;
(5) each copy of the authoritative copy and any copy of a copy is readily identifiable as
a copy that is not the authoritative copy; and
(6) any revision of the authoritative copy is readily identifiable as an authorized or
unauthorized revision.
45 See Winn, supra note 42, at 1061 ("Revised section 9-105(1) provides that electronic
chattel paper must consist of a single authoritative copy of the chattel paper record or
records which is unique, identifiable, and generally unalterable.").
46 See, e.g., Anna Lichtarowicz, Virtual Kingdom Richer than Bulgaria, BBC NEWS,
Mar. 29, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1l/hi/sci/tech/1899420.stm.
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Virtual environments are like a three-dimensional version of the web.47
People from all over the world are able to log into the same virtual
environment and share the same simulated physical context. Part of that
simulated physical context consists of virtual objects and places. These virtual
things and spaces (for example, virtual basketballs, houses, or shopping malls)
have value in real dollars.48 There is crossover between virtual environments
and the real world: people buy virtual objects with real money, and vice
versa.49 As virtual environments play an expanding role in commerce and
public life, the regulation of vii-tual property will become increasingly
important. 50
Virtual environments are currently used for medical, political, educational,
military, social, entertainment, and commercial purposes. Therapists use
virtual environments to treat patients with Asperger's Syndrome - a
neurological disorder that impairs the ability of a person to respond to social
cues. 51 Many Asperger's sufferers have embraced computer skills and online
communities as a way of helping them parse human relationships. 52 The
" For an excellent description of virtual worlds, see Greg Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The
Laws of Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1 (2004). For a more complete description of the
economics of virtual worlds, see Castronova, supra note 8, at 1-8.
"8 See Castronova, supra note 8, at 4; Lichtarowicz, supra note 46.
49 See Julian Dibbell, The Unreal Estate Boom, WIRED MAGAZINE, Jan. 2003, available
at http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/ 1.01/gaming.html (describing purchases of virtual
objects, including a $750 virtual residence, $5 pair of virtual sandals, and many other
objects).
50 See Lichtarowicz, supra note 46 ("A virtual country has entered into the world
economy.").
"1 For example, Project Brigadoon, an effort devoted to developing virtual worlds for the
treatment of Asperger's Syndrome, has purchased a virtual island within Second Life (a
non-game open architecture virtual environment that lets users build whatever content they
like), and has established a community there. See About Briadoon, Posting of John Lester to
Braintalk, http://braintalk.blogs.com/brigadoon/2005/01/aboutbrigadoon.html (Jan. 7,
2005, 14:57 EST).
52 John Lester, the President of Braintalk Communities, explained the value of virtual
worlds to Asperger's patients as follows:
[T]here are many autism/[Asperger's Syndrome] people who are very high functioning
and are seeking out new online technologies to help them communicate with people
and to help them practice their socialization skills.... What's special about the
Second Life environment is that it is visually very REAL. You create your own avatar
to represent you in this virtual world, and instead of just seeing names on a webpage
you actually SEE other people standing around you in a 3-d world....
Second life provides a more perceptually immersive socialization environment online.
It looks more "real"... and gives you more freedom. Yet it is still not the "real
world," so it is a place that people can practice their socialization and collaborative
skills in a much more consequence free place.
More About Brigadoon, Posting of John Lester to Braintalk,
http://braintalk.blogs.com/brigadoon/2005/01/moreabout-brig.html (Jan. 7, 2005, 14:58
EST).
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patients come to an understanding of houses and social spaces by building
versions of them inside a virtual environment. 53 They interact with each other,
practice social proximity, and engage in creative works and conversations.
54
Virtual environments are also used for politics. In Second Life, a prominent
virtual environment, one virtual neighborhood was devoted to political debate
during the presidential elections. 55 The houses were plastered with political
signs. One side of the street consisted of a series of monuments and political
advertisements for one political party; the other side of the street consists in
rebuttals and posters for the other party. In a square nearby, a live electronic
feed of the candidates for office debating was piped in, as if the candidates
were debating in the town square.56
The United States military uses virtual worlds for training.57 The virtual
environment There has designed a Virtual Baghdad project on commission for
the Army. 58 The environment re-creates sections of Baghdad down to street
signs and palm trees. Other people in the There environment play the roles of
inhabitants of the area, while soldiers deal with various scenarios, such as an
attack on a checkpoint. The soldiers are also able to learn tactical coordination
with other soldiers around the world, no matter where they are stationed. 59 The
Army has since expanded the Virtual Baghdad project to permit There to build
a full virtual simulacrum of the whole planet that can be used for training
soldiers in specific locations. 60
Virtual environments are also used for education and acculturation. 61 The
53 See About Brigadoon, supra note 51.
54 Id.
51 See The Election Comes to Second Life!, Posting of Wagner James Au to New World
Notes, http://secondlife.blogs.com/nwn/2004/04/theelectionco.html (Apr. 12, 2004, 7:15
EST).
56 In Second Life, the virtual world I am describing here, media can be imported from the
outside world into the virtual environment. In the case of the presidential debates, an
enterprising netizen imported live network feeds of the candidates and placed them in the
virtual world. Id.
57 Beth Noveck, Introduction: The State of Play, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1, 2 & n.8
(2005) (citing Peter S. Jenkins, The Virtual World as Company Town, 8 J. OF INTERNET LAW
1 (2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=565181).
" See Lindsey Arent, The Army's Virtual World, G4TV, Mar. 16, 2004,
http://www.g4tv.com/screensavers/features/492/TheArmysVirtualWorld.html.
'9 Id. ("Soldiers across the globe are training now and over the internet.... That's a
capability the Army has never had. We can put hundreds or thousands of people into this
environment.") (quoting James Grosse, Army engineer, on the There project).
60 Id. ("The Army likes the Baghdad concept so much, it's given There four years and $3
million to create a virtual simulation of the entire planet ... ").
61 See Noveck, supra note 57, at 1 & n.7 (citing The Virtual Baghdad Project,
http://www.nv.cc.va.us/home/nvbrada/braddog/Links.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2005) and
Margaret Wertheim, Virtual Camp Trains Soldiers in Arabic, and More, N.Y. Times, July 6,
2004, at F3).
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Tactical Language Project, being developed at the University of Southern
California Center for Research in Technology for Education, teaches language
using virtual environments in order to teach students language within a cultural
context. Because virtual environments simulate a shared physical context, they
can be used to teach social cues and non-verbal communication. 62 More
complex issues, like gaining and keeping trust, can be addressed at the social
level within a virtual environment. 63  The Tactical Language Project is
currently used to teach Arabic; Daft and Indonesian virtual environments will
be created later this year.64
Virtual environments are now one of the most important forms of
entertainment. More South Koreans play in virtual worlds than watch
television.65 A single South Korean environment claims 17 million subscribers
worldwide. 66 The projected virtual world population of China numbers 26.33
million.67 And the trend is growing, especially in the United States, where the
first virtual environments devoted to entertainment with a potential for over
one million inhabitants have recently launched.
68
Within virtual environments, virtual objects of all types change hands for
real money.69 As a result, commerce in virtual environments - both the sale of
virtual property for real money, and the exchange of virtual property for other
62 Wertheim, supra note 61 ("In tense situations like those induced by war, nonverbal
messages may be just as important as words themselves. The Tactical Language Project...
is intended to teach such skills. [A user may] learn, for example, that when [he] starts or
finishes a conversation with an important person, he can cross his right hand over his heart
and bow slightly, a common gesture of respect in the Arab world.").
63 Id. ("One of [the student's] most critical beliefs is their trust level.... If [the student]
behaves appropriately, he will gain... trust and they will help him; if not, he is likely to
cause suspicion.").
64 Id.
65 See Mimi Luse, More than a Game, E.PEAK, July 19, 2004,
http://www.peak.sfu.ca/the-peak/2004-2/issue 12/fe-online.html.
66 See Posting of Gravity Corp. to Ragnarok Online,
http://www.gamespot.com/pc/rpg/ragnarokonline/factsheet_6091529.html (Mar. 14, 2004,
10:44 EST). Numbers of users are difficult to determine from numbers of subscriptions.
Lineage, another Korean virtual environment, had roughly four million subscribers at its
peak in 2004. See generally Bruce Woodcock, An Analysis of MMOG Subscription Growth,
available at http://www.mmogchart.com. (last visited Sept. 11, 2005) (tracking active
subscriptions for online environments).
67 Chinese Technological Creation Initiative, http://www.jiaoyiba.com (last visited Feb.
26, 2005) (state-run resource for Chinese online world development) (Chinese language
website).
68 See, e.g., Mark Ward, Online Gaming Set to Explode, BBC NEWS, June 9, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/2031091.stm (predicting 114 million online garners
worldwide by 2006). World of Warcraft in fact recently became the first US-based virtual
environment to exceed one million subscribers. See Woodcock, supra note 66.
69 See Castronova, supra note 8, at 16-20.
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virtual property - is expanding rapidly.70 The projected U.S. revenue from
sales of virtual objects in real-world currency is approximately $100 million
dollars, and over $1.5 billion worth of transactions occurs yearly through in-
environment trades. 71 The secondary market in virtual items was recently
estimated at over $880 million dollars, and is expanding quickly.72 One virtual
environment had, as of 2002, a greater net worth than Bulgaria and a higher
GNP per capita than India or China.73 Likewise, the individual as well as the
aggregate value of the virtual property bought and sold is rising - a piece of
virtual real estate within a virtual environment recently sold for approximately
$30,000. 7
4
Although the amount of current investment and interest in virtual worlds
demonstrates their present and growing importance in their own right, virtual
world technology will also change the real world. The shift from the telephone
to the internet represented a sea change in how people did business and
constructed social relationships because it changed how quickly computers
could search for what we wanted. The weakest link in that chain is no longer a
computer's ability to search. The weakest link is now the user's ability to
evaluate what he or she is seeing.
Virtual worlds use electronically-simulated physical context as a means of
conveying large amounts of information quickly to computer users. Humans
do not process things in lists. Humans process things in context. The internet
is still like the telephone: in many respects it lacks the capacity to put anything
into a physical context. For example, if you are shopping for a bedroom set on
the internet, you cannot know whether it will fit into your bedroom or whether
it will match your other furniture. If you were shopping through the medium
of a virtual world, you could arrange the furniture in a virtual simulacrum of
your home, before buying it. Furniture retailers are already offering prototypes
of this kind of service. 75 Clothing retailers offer a similar service: the customer
70 See id. at 37.
7 Id. at 3. See also Posting of Edward Castronova to Terranova,
http://terranova.blogs.com/terranova/2004/10/secondary-marke.html (Oct. 30, 2004, 12:37
EST) (discussing this $100 million estimate).
72 See Posting of Garthilk to Okratas,
http://www.okratas.com/modules.php?op-modload&name=News&file=article&sid=57
(Feb. 13, 2005, 12:00 EST).
11 Lichtarowicz, supra note 46 (quoting Castronova, supra note 8, at 3).
14 See Tom Loftus, Virtual Worlds End Up in Real World's Courts, MSNBC.coM, Feb.
7, 2005, http://scj.msnbc.com/id/6870901/.
75 Ikea already offers a basic version of this service, but only for its products; of course,
without connectivity, you cannot compare different manufacturers - one of the reasons
having an interconnected virtual environment is important. Similarly, Amazon.com's
recently-released A9 function permits three dimensional searches of the real world for
purposes of choosing a place to start a business. See Take a Virtual Walk with Amazon's
A9, CNN.cOM, Jan. 27, 2005,
http:/www.cnn.com/2005/TECH/intemet/l/27/amazon.a9.reut/ (on file with author);
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creates a virtual model of himself, and fits virtual clothes to order real ones. 76
For another example of how context increases human absorption of
information, examine the complexity of information that we routinely process
in social situations. Imagine that you attend a party. As soon as you walk into
the room, you instantly process enough information to stump a supercomputer:
the way people are standing, talking, the way groups are positioned, the
"tension in the air." All of this information we derive from physical and visual
context. This has long been a theme in software design. For example,
graphical user interfaces (GUIs) - the desktop and icons that we are so familiar
with - replaced the DOS prompt that was dominant in the 1980s. 77 The reason
for the change is the human-to-computer interface. The GUI does not help the
computer. The GUI helps the user see information in context, and therefore
process it orders of magnitude faster and better.
Virtual worlds offer the possibility of fully contextualized social software on
the scale of the internet. If you need to be examined by a doctor across the
world, you can do so not only immediately (a result we can achieve now with
video), but interactively. If your law firm needs to create a dedicated team
gathered from around the world for an IPO to work around the clock and keep
each other physically accountable for staying on task, you can meet in a virtual
room and work until the job is done. If you need to attend an office party in
Japan, you will be able to.
Virtual environments, however, will not give us these benefits unless we
protect rights in virtual property. Currently, the law in the United States does
not recognize rights in virtual property. 78 Although hundreds of millions of
dollars change hands annually for virtual houses, chairs, money, clothes, or the
like, almost all of the transactions are gray-market. 79 People sell virtual
objects on eBay for real world money every day.80 However, rights in virtual
property are either not enforced, or are expressly prohibited by the creator of
the virtual environment, who holds the intellectual property interest in the
environment itself.
To sum up, virtual property is code that mimics the properties of real-space
objects. It is rivalrous, connected, and persistent. Further, code with such
Jefferson Graham, Online Yellow Pages Take You on Virtual Stroll, USA TODAY, Jan. 26,
2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/2005-01-26-
amazon-usatx.htm.
76 See, e.g., My Virtual Model, www.landsend.com (last visited Aug. 1, 2005) (follow
"My Virtual Model" link).
77 See, e.g., Robert Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious About User-Friendly Mass-Market
Licensing for Software, 12 GEO. MASON L. REv. 687, 695 (2004) (describing the evolution
of graphical user interfaces).
78 China and Korea have both begun the process of recognizing such rights. See infra
Part IV.D.
79 See Castronova, supra note 8, at 19.
80 Id. at 29-36 (detailing virtual-to-real and real-to-virtual sales, and calculating the GNP
for a single virtual world).
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properties is rapidly becoming the rule, rather than the exception, in
interconnected, online, persistent spaces like the internet. So, how should law
classify code that is intangible, but that has been coded to act as if it were
tangible? The law has long relied on intangibility as a proxy for non-
rivalrousness, but there is no reason to cling to the proxy if the proxy is bad. If
an intangible object is rivalrous, there is no reason to treat the ownership of the
property purely as a matter of intellectual property. Further, the question is
pressing: although virtual property is already immensely important in the form
of URLs, domain names, email addresses, chat rooms, and other familiar
resources, the phenomenon of virtual worlds and fully contextualized virtual
environments is forcing us to look at these resources in a new light. The
question then becomes whether the common law of property has anything to
contribute to the regulation of rivalrous, connected, and persistent code.
I1. THE COMMON LAW OF PROPERTY AND THE THREAT TO EMERGENT
PROPERTY RIGHTS
We have thus far seen how many important online resources have nothing to
do with intellectual property. On the other hand, these resources have been
designed to have the legally relevant characteristics of real and chattel
property. This makes the common law of property an obvious possible source
of law for these resources. The critical question is whether the law of property
can have anything useful to contribute to the regulation of intangibles such as
virtual property.
Property theory examines how scarce resources ought to be put to use. 81
However, it is not obvious that internet resources are scarce. Cyberspace is
infinite, or practically so. People can create more space for themselves.
Because internet resources do not seem to be scarce, property theorists
(distinguished from intellectual property scholars) have, to date, had little to
say about code.82 But even where there is plenty of space, people can still
81 The theories of property I describe in this section are more or less wedded to the
school of welfare economics (or its cousin, public choice). Of course, there are other
theories of property. For example, Margaret Radin has set forth a theory of property as
personality - wedding rings and houses, she argues, are property because they are a part of
the self-conception of the owner. See Radin, supra note 31, at 958. I do not reject such
approaches, but simply note that they are outside of the scope of this piece. Further, I do not
address here the question of whether an exclusionary right is the sole relevant right that
defines a property interest, or whether property consists of integrated conceptions of
acquisition, exclusion, and disposal, except to note that an integrated property approach
(especially one that focuses on the role of labor in property) is particularly pertinent to a
theory of virtual property, because nearly all of the value in virtual property is created by
labor. See Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIz. L.
REv. 371, 376 (2003) (proposing an integrated theory of property that restores the role of
labor in property acquisition).
82 Property theorists have had plenty to say about the internet. However, most property-
based approaches to internet resources use a chattel-property theory. The idea is that my
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block each other from making productive use of those resources they do
develop. Mutual exclusion from resource use creates a problem as acute as the
usual story of scarce resources. Thus, the following section outlines how
property theory views resource allocation, and describes how property theory
might be productively applied to online resources.
A. As Technology Opens New Possibilities, Property Law Allocates
Emerging Harms and Benefits So Owners Internalize the Costs of
Property Use
As technology changes, new uses of resources emerge. Property law
protects emerging interests in property so that the emergent property interest
may be productively used.83 One function of property is the guiding of
incentives to use resources productively as technology changes those
incentives. 8
4
Harold Demsetz told the basic story of a commons in land, which causes
overexploitation. Demsetz made his point with a simple historical example.
The rise of private land values among certain Native American tribes coincided
with the rise in feasibility and value of the commercial fur market.85 The value
of privatization was that it prevented overhunting, since each landowner now
bore the full loss of each animal.8 6 Demsetz theorized that privatization
internalized the externalities of overhunting. 87 Thus, the private landowner
had incentives to husband resources that the commons holder did not. 88
Demsetz emphasized that the emergence of property interests should be best
understood by association with the emergence of new beneficial or harmful
effects. 89 The efficient allocation of these new effects is one important goal of
control over the physical chattel of a computer gives me control over online resources. See,
e.g., Patricia Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 2170 (2004);
Richard Epstein, Cybertrespass, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 76 (2003).
83 HAROLD DEMSETZ, OWNERSHIP, CONTROL, AND THE FIRM: THE ORGANIZATION OF
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 177 (Blackwell 1988); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons,
162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243-1250 (1968), reprinted in ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY
LAW (B. Ackerman, ed., 1975).
84 DEMSETZ, supra note 83, at 106. ("If the main allocative function of property rights is
the internalization of beneficial and harmful effects, then the emergence of property rights
can be understood best by their association with the emergence of new or different
beneficial or harmful effects.").
85 Id. at 107-09.
86 Id. at 109 ("Forest animals confine their territories to relatively small areas, so that the
cost of internalizing the effects of husbanding these animals is considerably reduced.").
87 Id. at 108 ("Because of the lack of control over hunting by others, it is in no person's
interest to invest in increasing or maintaining the stock of game. Overly intensive hunting
takes place.").
88 Id.
89 Id. at 106-08.
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property law.90 Property rights emerge in response to the desires of the
interacting parties for adjustments to the new benefit-cost possibilities. 9 1
Property law adapts to protect the emergent interests as technology makes
them possible.
Technology is an engine of change in the law of property. In Demsetz's
model, shifts in the gains of internalization occur as a function of technology.
92
And "property rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of
internalization become larger than the cost of internalization. ' 93 As new
technology develops, and new markets open, changes in property law alter
those rights that are poorly attuned to the new markets.
94
Much of the current new law of property is explained by this theory of
shifting technology and markets. As cell lines become valuable, the question
of whether the genetic contributor or the laboratory researcher has the greater
property interest in the cell line becomes important.95 Property rights in
breaking news stories emerge as communications technology makes the
propagation of news a matter of minutes rather than days.96 Property rights in
data compilations emerge as storage and markets for such compilations
radically increase. 97 As discussed below, property rights in virtual property are
emerging as the software networks take on new characteristics - those of
actual spaces and objects.
This story of technological change and shifting property interests is not only
told by economists. The public choice account of property predicts stability in
90 The two theories currently in circulation indicate that the closed and limited legal
forms of property have two goals: informational and aggregational. The first idea is that
simple property forms are easy for third parties to search. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra
note 12, at 27. The second idea is that fragmented property rights prevent sales to high-
value users. Heller, supra note 13, at 640.
91 DEMSETZ, supra note 83, at 106-07 ("It is my thesis in this part that the emergence of
new property rights takes place in response to the desires of the interacting persons for
adjustment to new cost-benefit possibilities.") (emphasis omitted).
92 Id. at 106 ("New techniques, new ways of doing the same things, and doing new things
- all invoke harmful and beneficial effects to which society has not been accustomed.")
(emphasis omitted).
93 Id. at 107.
94 Id. at 107 ("Increased internalization, in the main, results from changes in economic
values, changes which stem from the development of new technology and the opening of
new markets, changes to which old property rights are poorly attuned.").
95 See Moore v. Regents of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (1990) (dealing with claims of property in
genetic material).
96 See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (protecting quasi-
property interest in breaking news stories).
17 See eBay v. Bidder's Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (granting
injunction against competitor auction website, which had been compiling eBay auction
information).
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property absent technological change. 98 When change occurs, interest groups
surrounding emergent property rights will attempt to allocate harms and
benefits as best suits them. 99 "To take an extreme but illustrative hypothetical,
if technological change made it feasible for millions of citizens to live and
work deep underground, we might expect some reshuffling of property rights
in land - much as air rights were redefined when air travel became feasible." 10 0
In the same way, when technological change makes it feasible for millions of
citizens to interact and work in intangible three-dimensional spaces, we might
well expect some reshuffling of property rights online.
However, there is an additional component: prior rights holders surrounding
emergent property rights will attempt to take for themselves, or stifle, emergent
property rights when new value emerges.' 0' Thus, absent the intervention of
law, new value will generally be allocated according to interest-group power
asymmetries. 0 2 An emergent property right is likely to be defended by an
ineffective interest group. The group defending an emergent right will be
diffuse, since the boundaries of the property right itself are not choate. Thus,
the constituency for an emergent property right is not likely to be effective
because it will have trouble identifying who is a member and who is not.
Both the economic and public choice theories of emerging property rights
reference technology as the engine of change. This portion of property theory
clearly is applicable to rights in online resources. As online technology is
changing, harms and benefits are shifting, and the law is shifting to map to new
cost-benefit possibilities. However, the story of technology and emerging
property interests only works if there is a theory of how incentives may be
effectively internalized by how we allocate property. The challenge to
applying theories of the commons to internet resources is that they are, if not
infinite, then effectively so. Thus, the next section discusses how inefficient
allocations of resources can emerge, even where resources are not scarce.
B. The Challenge for Property Theory with Respect to Online Resources Is
to Articulate a Theory of Internalization
The primary challenge is articulating a theory by which the privatization of
virtual property would result in significant efficiencies. The commons story
98 Saul Levmore, Property's Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
181, 191 (2003).
99 Id. at 189.
100 Id. at 188.
101 Id. ("These examples illustrate the optimistic and skeptical stories regarding the
evolution of property rights. The optimistic one is of the standard law and economics
variety, and it suggests alterations in rights in response to technological changes .... [T]he
second story sketched here offers a more skeptical depiction of the evolution of property
rights, as it focuses on interest groups and, the expectation that political (and litigation)
power will not be distributed evenly across the population or even the economy.").
102 Id.
20051 1067
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW RE VIE W
does not seem to have direct applications to virtual property: even where
property is rivalrous (i.e., one person's use excludes another's), there is no
lessening of the overall ability for the next person to obtain "enough and as
good."10 3 Other people can simply seek more of the same type of property. If
one internet address is already registered, another is available. 10 4 If one email
address is taken, another can be invented.
A brief example of how the tragedy of the traditional account of the
commons poorly describes use allocation problems on the net will frame the
discussion. In the case of the ICANN registration system, as protected by the
cybersquatting laws, there is no commons problem. 0 5 If www.monopoly.com
is desired by both fans and Hasbro, we need only expand and add a name -
www.monopoly.fan would do nicely - and www.monopoly.tm would be
presumptively assigned to the trademark holder, obviating any confusion t0 6
So if the system can be expanded to make more room, why have the ICANN
system? Overlapping use rights in a commons seem to be, if not harmless, of
lesser concern in the internet context. But there remains a problem: if parties
can mutually exclude each other from productive use of resources, the resource
will go underdeveloped. Thus, the next section discusses the property theory
addressing overlapping exclusion rights - a property anticommons.
103 See JOHN LOcKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 312 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed.
Cambridge Univ. Press 1970) (1698). Attempts to articulate a theory of commons overuse
in online resources have relied on the fact that bandwidth and processor speeds are
theoretically limited. See, e.g., Harold Smith Reeves, Comment, Property in Cyberspace,
63 U. CHI. L. REv. 761, 776 (1996) (discussing the argument that "[c]omputer systems have
finite computing and storage capacity"). The problem is that processing capacity
consistently outpaces use. See id. at 775 ("Although this argument is not without merit, it
proves too much in a world where resource depletion is not a significant concern.").
.04 There are limits, of course. The current domain name system is now running short of
useful (i.e., non-nonsense) internet addresses created using the English alphabet. In
response, software developers are attempting to create a Unicode standard for intemet
addresses expressed in other alphabets.
101 This example arose out of conversations with Eben Moglen, of Columbia Law
School.
106 Of course, the internet does not quite work that way, and this is important to my
analysis. Let us say that two fans of the Monopoly game want to fight over the fan website.
If we further differentiate, into www.monopoly.fanl and www.monopoly.fan2, both fans
lose an important and valuable part of their intemet real estate: the focusing effect. This is
why websites like www.dictionary.com are valuable: people have not heard of them, but
they guess them when they are trying to get a certain kind of information. Another way of
phrasing this point is that search costs rise as internet real estate becomes differentiated.
This is Thomas Merrill's point about real world property - that legal forms of property
constitute a closed and limited set (called the "numerus clausus") because limiting
idiosyncratic property forms lowers search costs. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 12. The
same is true of URLs. Thus, a response to Eben Moglen's point about the unlimited nature
of cyberspace is that while it is true that the internet is susceptible to infinite expansion
through variation, that very variation causes information to become more expensive.
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C. Public and Private Anticommons
In the tragedy of the commons, overlapping use rights in property create
incentives to overuse and deplete the resource owned in common. In the
tragedy of the anticommons, however, overlapping rights to exclude permit
rights-holders to block each other from making productive use of the resource.
This section thus first describes the anticommons in property, and then shows
how such an anticommons can arise from private ordering (contract) just as it
can arise from government action (privatization).
1. The Privatization Anticommons
Michael Heller described the problem of the anticommons in property by
analyzing the Russian experience of privatization. 10 7 An anticommons is a
state in which overlapping rights of exclusion cause property to go unused or
underused.' 08 Heller showed that when the former Soviet Union moved from
communist to capitalist market structures, it ran the risk of creating an
anticommons by vesting use rights in different holders, some of whom had
political or other economic interests in holding the property fallow.10 9
Heller asked why storefronts in Moscow remained empty while illegal
street-side kiosks thrived and were full of goods.' 10 The answer was that the
process of privatization had fragmented and multiplied the number of people
that merchants were required to negotiate with for use of the building."1
Merchants who wished to use a storefront were required to negotiate with
multiple groups that had been given rights in the structure as part of
privatization.112 These groups often had conflicting incentives for putting the
building as a whole to productive use. 113 Thus, for example, if a bakery was
privatized in Moscow, one group was given rights to use the storefront space,
one in the cash flow generated by the business, one in the actual building that
housed the bakery. 1 4 These rights were handed to the various groups that had
previously been involved in operating the bakery or the building. Heller found
107 See generally Heller, supra note 13, at 633-35.
10 Id. at 623 ("[A]nticommons property [is] a type of property regime that may result
when initial endowments are created as disaggregated rights rather than as coherent bundles
of rights in scarce resources.").
109 Id. at 639-40.
'10 Id. at 642-43.
1 Id. at 656 ("For example, a worker's cooperative may claim that the single bakery that
they occupy constitutes the object of property subject to their private ownership. Another
owner, such as a defunct state bread-making enterprise, may claim that the entire of several
dozen bakery outlets is a single, indivisible, corporate asset.").
112 Id.
113 Id. at 640-41 ("In the storefront example, because of the divergent incentives between
public agency owners and their bureaucratic agents, negotiations may only be possible
through informal or corrupt channels.").
114 Id. at 656.
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that Moscow merchants preferred illegal street kiosks because there was only
one party to negotiate with - the crimelords who ran a "protection" racket for
kiosk merchants.]15
To demonstrate visually how certain divisions of rights would result in
unproductive resource use, Heller discussed "horizontal" and "vertical"
property rights.1 6 A "vertical" property right is one that cuts across all of the
various objections and permits the property to be used as a whole. A
"horizontal" right is one that is not in itself useful, but which cuts across
vertical rights. For example, if the ownership of a tractor were divided such
that one person owned the wheels, another person owned the engine, and a
third person owned the steering wheel, a person who wanted to use or buy the
tractor as a whole would have to negotiate with three parties to gain any kind
of useful right. The right to use the tractor as a whole would be the "vertical
right." The right in the wheel has no use value by itself, because the tractor
operates at the level of the whole unit. As a result, a right in the wheel is a
crosscutting horizontal right, which can be used to prevent use of the tractor as
a whole.
Similarly, as in Heller's example, if one group owns the right to the cash
flow a business site produces, another has the right to make use of the
storefront, and the third has managerial control over the building in which the
business is situated, a merchant who wishes to use the storefront for his
business will find it difficult to negotiate over the fragmented property
rights. 1 7 The useful unit of property is the ability to use the storefront as a
whole. And each of the property fragments that cut across the vertical right to
use the storefront as a whole is a crosscutting horizontal right.
Of course, the terminology is inexact. But the point of the visual is an
important one: fragmentation of rights does not automatically create an
anticommons. Breaking up a commons vertically - that is, with special
attention to giving rights-holders useful rights that they can sell - is a form of
fragmentation. But breaking up a commons vertically does not result in an
anticommons because rights do not cut across productive uses. Fragmentation
only creates an anticommons when the resulting property fragments cut across
useful rights.' 18
115 Id. at 644 ("Creation of commercial space through corruption and protection contracts
can be reasonably stable over time when procedures become routinized ... ").
116 Id. at 670 ("Private property usually breaks up the material world 'vertically,' with
each owner controlling a core bundle of rights in a single object .... By contrast,
anticommons property creates 'horizontal' relations among competing owners of
overlapping rights in an object.").
117 Id. at 674 ("[E]ven if the number of parties and transaction costs are low, the resource
still may not be efficiently used because of bargaining failures generated by holdouts, as
sometimes seems to happen with Moscow storefronts.").
118 Id.
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2. The Private Anticommons
The anticommons idea is useful beyond Heller's analysis of government
privatization. Private ordering can create an anticommons just as government
privatization can. People can write contracts that make property unusable, or
that hinder third party purchasers from making higher value use of the
property. Consider the phenomenon of "fancies" in real estate law. Fancies
are idiosyncratic contractual use restrictions on land (beyond the permissible
covenants) that purport to run with the land.' 19 If two people agree on a fancy,
they are agreeing on a new form of property rights - one will hold the right to
the fancy, the other will hold a fee simple minus the fancy.120
The difficulties arise, of course, when a third party seeks to purchase the
land. There are two problems - one of information, one of negotiation. First,
if the fancy is unrecorded the problem is clear: now the price of every parcel of
land rises by the amount of the search cost necessary to ensure that the
property is free of fancies. 21 If the fragmented property form (the fee simple
minus the fancy) is enforced, information costs go up.' 22  Second, the
fragmented right now creates a negotiation problem. If you want to use the
entire land (that is, remove the fancy), you must deal with two people, not one.
Thus, the emergence of an anticommons outside of the privatization context is
not a marginal event; rather, it is a common side-effect of private ordering of
transactions.
When it comes to realizing value out of trades, therefore, the law of contract
is balanced by the law of property. We do not permit contracts that lock
property into low-value uses, or that make it too difficult for other parties to
make productive use of the property. 23 Thus, although the idea of the
anticommons is recent, the function of property law in preventing an
anticommons is not. The common law of property has long sought to unify
marketable title in a single person who then has the full incentives to maximize
the value, minimize the damage, and alienate the property when someone can
put it to better use. There are many examples. Forms of property that required
a feudal relationship between lord and tenant were eliminated by the statute
Quia Emptores in 1290, which reduced feudal property to saleable forms and
11' See Merrill & Smith, supra note 12, at 25-26 (discussing systemic costs of allowing
fancies to burden property).
120 Id. at 26.
121 Id. ("In modem terminology, the Lord Chancellor thought that permitting [fancies] to
be established as property rights would create unacceptable information costs to third
parties.").
122 See id. at 26-27 ("When individuals encounter property rights, they face a
measurement problem.... The need for standardization in property law stems from an
externality involving measuring costs: Parties who create new property rights will not take
into account the full magnitude of the measurement costs they impose on strangers to the
title.").
123 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY §§ 3.2-3.7 (2000).
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solved the fragmentation problem caused by subinfeudation. 124 As discussed
above, fancies are generally not recognized in property law.' 25 Undisclosed or
unrecorded covenants are not enforced at all as against a bona fide
purchaser. 126 Indeed, for a covenant to run with land, numerous restrictions
must be met, each of which limits parties' ability to craft personal and
idiosyncratic property rights.' 27 To take another example, the infamous Rule
Against Perpetuities can be quite simply read as a limit on the fragmentary
effect of dead hand control - if the living inherit in fee simple, they may either
put the resource to a high-value use, or sell to a higher-value user.128
Similarly, the law of adverse possession quiets title in those making productive
use of abandoned resources. 129 These and many other examples demonstrate
the common law's tendency to group useful property rights in a single holder's
hands. Thus, the common law of property has had a long and historic role in
resisting contractual and idiosyncratic burdens on property.
To draw the strands of this section thus far together, Demsetz demonstrates
that as technologies change, new rights emerge. When this occurs, Demsetz
demonstrates that emerging property rights should be protected in ways that
internalize the costs of use of a resource. And there is no reason to abandon
this reasoning when the externality at issue is not a tragedy of the commons,
but a tragedy of the anticommons, because private ownership solves
anticommons problems by aggregating useful alienable rights in the hands of a
single property owner.
D. The Literature of Internet Propertization and the Anticommons
Other theorists have reached the conclusion that property law is relevant to
the internet (although they have not used the reasoning set forth here). This
section examines the prior attempts at applying theories of property law to the
internet, and finds them lacking. First, this section examines and rejects the
currently influential scholarship describing any propertization of online rights
124 DAVID R. COQUILLETTE, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE 107-13 (1999)
(describing the role of the statute Quia Emptores in English legal history).
125 Merrill & Smith, supra note 112 at 26.
126 See, e.g., Story Bed & Breakfast, LLP v. Brown County Area Plan Comm'n, 789
N.E.2d 13, 20 (2003) ("We hold that land use restrictions, however denominated... should
be recorded or otherwise memorialized in a manner reasonably calculated to provide notice
to a subsequent purchaser of land.").
127 See Glen 0. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1449-
52 (2004) (discussing servitudes on real and personal property).
128 See Jesse Dukeminier, A Modern Guide to Perpetuities, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1867, 1869-
71 (1986) (stating reasons for the Rule Against Perpetuities).
129 Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419,
2435-36 (2001) (reviewing the justifications for adverse possession, including that adversely
possessed land will be put to better use).
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as creating an internet anticommons.1 30 Second, this section rejects the
similarly influential scholarship that describes online property rights as a pure
extension of real-world chattel property rights over computers. 13 1
1. The "Digital Enclosure" Literature Is Flawed Because Not All
Fragmentation Constitutes an Anticommons
Although no economic analysis of virtual property has yet been published,
there have been several previous attempts to apply property theory to the
internet. The prior literature discussing the value of online propertization has
either condemned private internet property as part of a supposed digital
enclosure movement, or condoned private internet property as an extension of
property rights in chattels. 132 However, both of these major approaches are in
an important degree wrong.
The basic story of the digital enclosure literature is one of information
enclosure. 133 The digital enclosure literature argues that protecting websites
with passwords reduces the amount of information available to the rest of us,
and that as a result, such protection is undesirable. There is a fairness ethic at
work: if a person benefits from the broad readership the internet provides, but
does not contribute his own information to the information commons, he is
supposedly wrongfully enclosing his information to the detriment of
everyone. 34 Since the internet benefits from network effects (the more people
who contribute the more valuable it is), any withholding of information
supposedly deprives everyone else of value.135
130 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of
"Rights Management", 97 MICH. L. REv. 462, 561 (1998) (arguing in favor of maximum
access rather than ownership interests and maximum profit); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as
Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REv. 439, 474-75 (2003)
(contending that password protection of data on websites constitutes a digital enclosure);
Mark A. Lemley, Cyberspace as Place, 91 CAL. L. REv. 521, 539 n.82 (2003).
131 See, e.g., Bellia, supra note 82, at 2170-71 ("This article argues that property-rule
protection for network resources is more appropriate than scholars have thus far
recognized."); Epstein, supra note 82, at 75 (defending chattel-level property protection).
132 See Bellia, supra note 82, at 2224 (observing that system owners will always be able
to use technology to close access); Epstein, supra note 82, at 81 (noting that "[a] 'trespasser
is liable to respond in damages for such injuries as may result naturally.., in consequence
of his wrong'... . These rules carry over to cyberspace without missing a beat"); Hunter,
supra note 130, at 474-75 (describing the digital enclosure movement).
133 See Cohen, supra note 130, at 561 (arguing in favor of maximum access rather than
ownership interests and maximum profit); Hunter, supra note 130, at 474-75; Lemley, supra
note 130, at 539 n.82 (2003).
134 See Hunter, supra note 130, at 518 ("These proprietors have taken advantage of the
network externalities that define the Internet, and now they assert private property rights that
cut directly against it. As a matter of simple evenhandedness, then, the argument in favor of
the cyberspace enclosure movement falls away.").
135 Id.
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However, the digital enclosure literature fails in its effort to describe an
information anticommons. The enclosure of a commons may well be a loss to
holders of rights in the lost commons, but it is not an economic tragedy.
Imagine the original agricultural enclosure movement: common fields were
enclosed, and prior commons holders were dispossessed in favor of the new
private owner. 136 This is a moral tragedy, but not an economic one, since the
private owner will fully internalize the externalities of use of the land. In fact,
the new-minted private owner will have incentives to husband the land that the
commons-holders did not. 137
Not all fragmentation of rights in property results in an anticommons. The
question is not whether a resource is carved up, but how well. Fragmentation
is inefficient in and of itself (look at the development of condominiums and
timeshares, for example); but that fragmentation which results in overlapping
rights of exclusion creates an incentive to hold out and exclude all productive
use of the resource.1 38 It is the usefulness of the resulting property bundle that
matters: whether the rights connected with the use of a resource are such that a
third party would be interested in acquiring it. An anticommons results when
the bundles of use rights that emerge from the privatization process are not
themselves useful or vendable. 139 The theories of digital enclosure fall short
because they do not demonstrate that the resulting enclosed resources are
somehow impeded in the stream of commerce.
Further, the digital enclosure literature seeks to demonstrate an
anticommons in information, which is by nature non-rivalrous. One person's
use of information does not threaten another person's ability to get "enough
and as good."'140 For example, one person's creation of a telephone directory
does not stop another from going and compiling her own. An anticommons in
pure information cannot exist, because there cannot be overlapping rights to
exclude in a non-exclusive resource.
But where the digital enclosure literature fails, a theory of virtual property
succeeds in describing an internet anticommons. The two problems with the
information enclosure literature were that it dealt with information (which is
non-rivalrous) and that it overestimated the role of fragmentation alone in
creating an anticommons, rather than examining whether the resulting property
fragments were useful and marketable. Both of these criticisms fall away
136 See Ellickson, supra note 27, at 1392 (describing effects of agricultural enclosure).
137 DEMSETZ, supra note 83, at 107.
138 See Heller, supra note 13, at 652 n. 154 ("No tenant should sell first, because the last
tenant can then hold out to extract the gains from conversion.").
131 See id. at 67 1.
140 This is an argument that Locke, who wrote at the time of the agrarian enclosures,
would be intimately familiar with: as with Locke's acorns, one person's gathering of
information does not preclude another's gathering of the same. See Adam Mossoff, Locke's
Labour Lost, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 155, 156-59 (2002) (defending Locke's labor
theory of property).
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when we look at virtual property. Virtual property is, by definition, rivalrous.
Virtual property is useful as a unit - and that usefulness is destroyed by
crosscutting rights. If that usefulness is destroyed, as is currently happening,
we may say that an anticommons forms from the resulting fragmentation into
non-useful rights.
2. The Chattel-Property Literature Is Flawed Because it Ignores the
Distributed Nature of Online Resources
The other influential property theory relating to online resources is advanced
most prominently by Richard Epstein. 14 1 This "chattel theory" states that
property affects the internet through real world chattel property rights in
physical computers. 142 Thus, this literature considers primarily the rights of
companies to control access to their real world chattels that may be affected by
online activity. For example, if a company owns its own email servers, under
the chattel theory, it may bring a trespass action against people who use its
email servers without permission.
143
Although the chattel theory of online property does have significant appeal,
it has a fatal flaw: the resources that cybertrespass suits are intended to protect
(for example, email addresses) are not the same as the chattels (computers) that
form the basis for the trespass action. An email address is not the same as the
servers on which the information resides. A URL is not the same as the
computers that access or support it. The contours of an exclusionary right
based on a physical chattel will not "fit" resources that run across multiple
such chattels.1 44 Thus, when used to protect virtual property, chattel exclusion
rights necessarily protect too much or too little.
For example, the exclusion right derived from a physical chattel right in a
computer would protect only those functions of an online resource that
occurred within that computer. If someone hacked your personal computer to
get to your email, you would have a chattel exclusion right. But if someone
hacked just the ISP's server, you would have no cybertrespass right, even
though they hacked your email account. The idea that a person could not bring
an action because she does not own her own email server is simply strange.
On the other hand, the ISP would have many causes of action against people
who had not harmed its server in any significant way (after all, it was your
email account that was hacked). 145 The chattel property theory of online rights
141 Epstein, supra note 82, at 75 ("With cyberspace, the hard question is whether
technological changes could ever lead us to abandon the presumption that a deliberate
trespass counts as a private wrong.").
142 See id.
143 See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 299-300 (2003) (deciding whether intentional
trespass to an email server was actionable under trespass law where the servers were not
physically damaged).
144 See Heller, supra note 13, at 630.
145 Although we are discussing cybertrespass actions here, the problem is the same with
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therefore over- or underprotects rights because of the lack of fit between
chattels and online resources.
Moreover, chattel property rights have the capacity to actively interfere with
the productive use of online resources. Distributed computing resources are
useful whole pieces of code that run on multiple computers. Chattel property
rights as applied to distributed programs can become horizontal property rights
that cut across the vertical property right in distributed code. If each owner of
any computer involved in a distributed program can bring an action to enjoin
the whole, we create precisely the anticommons problem we have been striving
to avoid. As the next section shows, the chattel theory of online property can
therefore cause significant inefficiencies in the use of online resources.
III. FRAGMENTATION OF VIRTUAL PROPERTY
Having rejected the current academic descriptions of how property law
ought to regulate the internet, this section proposes a new model: the law
should act to limit an anticommons in virtual property. The internet is, by
design, layered.' 46 The physical computers and connections that are the
backbone of the net form the basis for internet communication; layered on top
of that are the transfer protocols that enable communications between
computers; layered on top of that is the basic code that creates a website or a
virtual world; layered on top of that is the intellectual property that inheres in
the content of the website or virtual world; and layered on top of that are the
creations of the environment users. 147 Virtual property built on the structure of
the internet is particularly susceptible to anticommons problems, because it is
necessarily built on other people's work.
This section will first define the useful unit of virtual property that must be
kept intact if property bundles are to be efficiently used and sold - the
"vertical" property right in code. Second, it will give two prominent examples
of how crosscutting horizontal property rights are fragmenting virtual property
rights into non-useful forms, and how surrounding rights-holders are blocking
the emergence of new and useful property forms online. And finally, it will
discuss the emergence of virtual property regimes comparatively, with a focus
on the emerging law of virtual property in China, Taiwan, and Korea.
laws that prohibit unauthorized entry to a computer: the owner of the computer, rather than
the owner of the damaged virtual property, would be the beneficiary of the cause of action.
See Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000 & Supp. 2004) (prohibiting
unauthorized access to "protected computers").
146 See, e.g., Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, 202 F.3d 573, 577 (2d Cir. 2000)
(describing the structure of the domain name system); see also ICANN Glossary,
http://www.icann.org/general/glossary.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2005) (defining Internet
Protocol).
147 See Daniel Benoliel, Cyberspace Technological Standardization: An Institutional
Theory Retrospective, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1259, 1266-1278 (2003) (describing the
structure and institutions of the internet).
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A. The "Vertical" Interest in Virtual Property Is the Code that Operates
Across Multiple Computers
Vertical rights on the internet will be underutilized if their use is subject to
multiple and overlapping horizontal rights. Although the "horizontal layer"
analogy is useful in the context of real property, the analogy comes into its
own in the virtual context, where one type of code is literally layered on top of
another. 148
To recap, a "vertical" interest in property is one that contains a useful and
saleable bundle of rights. A "horizontal" crosscutting property right is one that
is not itself useful, but which can be used to block productive use of the whole
property right.1 49 A "vertical" right in a car is the right to use the car as a
whole - the car is the relevant useful unit. A crosscutting "horizontal" right
might be the right to make use of the tires - not useful in its own right, but
capable of stopping anyone interested in using the car as a whole. 150 If we are
to successfully solve the internet anticommons problem, we must determine
what rights in code are "vertical" and what rights are "horizontal."
In the context of virtual property, the relevant useful unit is the code itself
Ownership of only part of an internet address, for example, is hard to sell to
someone else, and is not particularly useful to the owner by itself.
51
Ownership of part of a piece of virtual real estate is, again, not particularly
useful, since you have to negotiate with all other rights-holders in the real
estate to make unified use of it.' 52 The trait of persistence is part of the
problem. For code to be persistent, it must run on multiple computers, often a
mixture of servers and client-side applications. Because it does so, it is subject
to crosscutting chattel property rights.
Since virtual property operates as a unified whole only at the level of code,
the appropriate package of property rights also appears at the level of code.
That is the right that matters. That is the right that is saleable. For example, if
you sell an internet address, you don't sell the physical computers on which it
resides. If you transfer an email address, you don't hand over your personal
computer. The code right is what is important, no matter what system or
chattel the code runs on. So, when we are considering where to make the slice
between online property rights, we will preserve useful bundles of rights by
148 See O'Rourke, supra note 21, at 600.
149 Heller, supra note 13, at 670.
150 Id. at 670-71 ("[A]nticommons property creates 'horizontal' relations among
competing owners of overlapping rights in an object.").
"I Although this should be obvious, part ownership in an entity owning a URL is not
useless, but that is the point: a single entity still controls the property, even though
ownership of the entity may be divided up.
152 If the purpose is not to make unified use of the property - for example, in a time-share
- then this point has less force. But where the goal is to make a unified use of the whole,
the division of property at the level of the code, rather than at the level of the system or the
chattel, is critical to preserve useful property rights in a single bundle.
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granting rights to virtual property at the level of code.
Therefore, I propose property-rights recognition at the level of code for
virtual property. This is where I part ways with Richard Epstein and Patricia
Bellia - leading apologists for the chattel theory of online property rights.
153
While their conception of online property rights is system-based, mine is code-
based. While in their conception the power of an owner over digital artifacts
ceases when the user steps past his firewall and into cyberspace, in my
conception the power of an owner persists over the use of the virtual property
regardless of the system or chattel currently connected to it. If I own a
building in a virtual world, I own it regardless of the intellectual property
inherent in the underlying code. I own it regardless of the physical chattel used
by another person to experience it. I own it, control it, can invite people to be
in it, hold meetings in it, work there, invest in it, and sell it to other people who
might want to do the same.
B. The Intel v. Hamidi Fallacy: Why Crosscutting Chattel Property Rights
Over Online Resources Disrupt Vertical Virtual Property and Create
Inefficient Outcomes
The concept of virtual property therefore challenges the currently influential
view that reduces online property rights to chattel property rights in physical
computers. This section shows that dividing up online property rights at the
level of physical chattel inevitably cuts across code, rather than packaging the
most useful and saleable aspect of the virtual property. When this happens,
physical chattel rights become horizontal crosscutting rights that threaten the
use of virtual property as a productive whole.
The Intel v. Hamidi case demonstrates the dangers of overextending
physical chattel rights over the intemet.15 4  In that case, a former Intel
employee, Ken Hamidi, emailed numerous current employees of Intel to
criticize Intel's employment practices.155 Hamidi sent emails on six occasions,
over a two year period, for a total of approximately 200,000 emails. 156 Intel
requested that Hamidi stop sending emails, and also attempted to introduce
filters to block Hamidi's emails. 157 Hamidi circumvented the filters and
continued emailing. 158 Intel therefore sought an injunction against Hamidi on
a theory of trespass to chattels, to stop Hamidi's mass mailings. 159 The trial
court granted the injunction, and the court of appeals affirmed it. 160 The
California Supreme Court reversed.
153 See supra note 82.
154 See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 299-300 (2003).
155 Id. at 299.
156 Id. at 313 (Brown, J., dissenting).
157 Id. at 300.
158 Id. at 329 (Brown, J., dissenting).
159 Id. at 299-300.
160 See id.
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The California Supreme Court's decision was deeply unsatisfying. The
court held that because Hamidi sent messages relatively few times, his
unpermitted access to Intel's email servers did not cause harm, and thus did not
trigger liability under the law of trespass to chattels.16 1 The court picked its
numbers very carefully: although Hamidi sent emails on relatively few
occasions, he sent them to between 3500 and 8000 employees each time.1 6
2
The court estimated that Hamidi sent as many as 200,000 emails, 163 yet
attempted to distinguish Hamidi's use of Intel's email system from spain,
which the court indicated Intel had every right to sue to block. 164 This
distinction fails utterly: every statute restricting unpermitted emails - including
California's own statutory restriction on unsolicited email - has measured
harm by the number of emails sent, rather than the number of times the emails
were sent. 165 Arguing that the harm Hamidi caused as one individual is
distinct from the harm of bulk unsolicited email as an aggregate is equally
disingenuous - given the low costs of sending high numbers of emails, the fact
that Hamidi was only one person is irrelevant.166 Thus, the California Supreme
Court's decision seems to be based on a deeply flawed argument.
However, the court of appeals' decision below, which upheld the trial
court's injunction prohibiting Hamidi from use of Intel's email servers, was
equally disturbing. 167 That decision stated that Intel's ownership of email
servers permitted it to enjoin use of the servers. 68 The problem, of course,
with this decision was that it enabled control over internet traffic by virtue of
physical ownership of a part of the physical structure of the internet. The
decision of the court of appeals created inefficient incentives. If a company
wished to be able to stop unwanted emails under the appellate standard, it was
161 Id. at 300.
162 Id. at 299-301. There is some dispute about the numbers. Intel indicated as many as
35,000 employees multiple times. Id. at 301.
163 Id. at 299.
164 Id. at 301; id. at 329 (Brown, J., dissenting).
165 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17529 (West 2005); 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (2000).
California's anti-spain legislation enacted penalties against commercial email so draconian
that the federal CAN-SPAM Act was passed in large part to preempt it. See William Baker,
The NetLaw Post: Canning Spam, NEWSPAPER ASS'N OF AM., Nov. 2003,
http://www.naa.org/artpage.cfm?AID=5386&SID=107 (providing an overview of the
California anti-spare law); Tom Spring, Laws Won't Solve Everything, PCWORLD, Nov. 10,
2003, http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/O,aid, 113329,00.asp. Indeed, the court of
appeals referred to this section when it determined that the legislature was aware of the costs
of bulk unsolicited email. See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 244, 252 (2001).
166 Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 313-14 (Brown, J., dissenting) (discussing the large number of
emails Hamidi was able to send). In fact, most of the criminal prosecutions under state and
federal laws for bulk unsolicited email have been against single individuals responsible for
millions of emails.
167 See Hamidi, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 244.
161 Id. at 249-50.
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required to invest in a physical server farm. 69 Otherwise, the cause of action
would go to whomever the company selected as internet service provider.
Rewarding companies for bringing their email capability in-house is not only
inefficient, it causes the problem to metastasize: as more companies respond to
the incentive to use physical chattel ownership to control cyberspace, more of
cyberspace becomes subject to such unilateral control. In addition, protecting
the physical chattel does little to mitigate the true cost of Hamidi's spain - the
aggregate time spent by employees deleting emails. That is a function of the
invasion of the virtual property interest, and has nothing to do with invasion of
the physical chattel at all.
Caught between two unacceptable poles, perhaps the California Supreme
Court's decision to choose speech values over property values was
understandable. To secure the physical architecture of the internet to users, the
court determined that under the common law of trespass to chattel, the plaintiff
was required to show harm to the physical email servers. 170 The court then
defined away the harm Hamidi caused by disaggregating him from every other
sender of unwanted email.1 71 Hamidi's hundreds of thousands of emails were
then reduced to the number of times he sent them, and his actions were deemed
not subject to injunction. Oddly, however, the court attempted to rebalance the
equation by adding a final caveat: Intel was free to attempt to technologically
block Hamidi, even though it had been denied injunctive relief.
A theory of virtual property makes the solution to Hamidi easy. The email
accounts that Intel provides its employees are property - not physical chattel
property, but virtual property. Intel is no more required to permit people to
spam its email accounts than it is required to permit a former employee to
scream imprecations on the shop floor. However, the free speech values that
the California Supreme Court sought to protect are also protected under a
theory of virtual property. The court correctly determined that non-harmful
use of Intel's physical chattel property was insufficient to support an
injunction. Thus, Intel cannot enjoin the non-harmful use of its servers to pass
on communications between third parties (for example, between two addresses
169 See id. at 247-48 (discussing the requirement, for an action sounding in trespass, of a
physical seizing or taking, or interference with or exercise of control over goods).
170 Hamidi, 71 P.3d at 302-303 ("[O]ne who intentionally intermeddles with another's
chattel is subject to liability only if his intermeddling is harmful to the possessor's
materially valuable interest in the physical condition, quality, or value of the chattel, or if
the possessor is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time .... ")..
171 Id. at 303-04 ("[T]he undisputed evidence revealed no actual or threatened damage to
Intel's computer hardware or software and no interference with its ordinary and intended
operation."). Cf CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1022 (S.D,
Ohio 1996) ("[H]andling the enormous volume of mass mailings that CompuServe receives
places a tremendous burden on its equipment.... To the extent that defendants'
multitudinous electronic mailings demand the disk space and drain the processing power of
plaintiffs computer equipment, those resources are not available to serve CompuServe
subscribers.").
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unrelated to Intel), even if Intel wishes to block the content.
The Hamidi problem presages another difficulty: claims of theft of virtual
property cannot be properly resolved by laws designed to fortify chattel rights
in individual computers. As discussed below, incidents of theft or destruction
of virtual property are being increasingly reported to police. 72 The initial
response to these thefts is for police to apply unauthorized access laws (anti-
hacking laws) to punish wrongdoers.' 73 However, such laws are inadequate
because it is possible to steal virtual property without ever touching a chattel
computer owned by the owner of the virtual property, or hacking a server. In
fact, such thefts are routine. The thief logs on to the account containing the
property, often making use of a password gained by fraud. The thief then
transfers, sells, or deletes the virtual property.
While the environment creator (on whose server the virtual property was
maintained) might have a cause of action for wrongful access, it would have
very little incentive to bring such a claim. 174 First, the environment creator has
lost nothing in net, since the virtual property has been transferred from one
user to another. Second, suing hackers for theft of virtual property may alert
users to security flaws through which accounts may be hacked (thus triggering
potential contract liability). Finally, environment creators have thus far
indicated that they perceive the recognition of virtual property to not be in their
best interests, since it threatens their ability to unilaterally control the
environment. 17 5 Thus, without a theory of virtual property, owners of such
property are left without an effective remedy.
We have therefore seen how, without a theory of virtual property, there is no
acceptable solution to the problem posed by Hamidi: either physical chattel
rights subject the structure of the internet to impermissible private censorship,
or owners of email accounts are compelled to endure unwanted contact.
Similarly, we have seen how cross-cutting physical chattel rights can prevent
online resources from being used as an intact and valuable whole - the
definition of an internet anticommons. And finally, we see how the current
laws that protect access to systems and chattel property do not provide any
useful remedies for theft of virtual property.
172 For example, over 22,000 incidents of theft of virtual property were reported to South
Korean police in 2004. See Mark Ward, Does Virtual Crime Need Real Justice?, BBC
NEWS, Sept. 29, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3138456.stm.
173 See, e.g., Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)(iii) (2005)
(authorizing fines and imprisonment as a penalty for accessing protected computers without
permission and causing damage in the process).
174 And, as against the environment creator, such a wrongful access cause of action
would be problematic. The environment creator cannot usefully distinguish between a thief
with a password and a regular account user. Thus, it is unlikely that the creator could be
held liable for failing to stop a thief who used a correct password to steal virtual property
from an account.
175 Admittedly, virtual world operators have an interest in preventing theft of virtual
items in order, for example, to retain present users and attract potential users.
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Crosscutting rights are only one part of the internet anticommons story. The
other part is how crosscutting rights can be used to eliminate emergent new
forms of property. Thus, the next section demonstrates how the internet
anticommons can be used to eliminate useful virtual property rights as they
emerge.
C. Elimination of Emergent Virtual Property by Contract
Demsetz and Levmore, discussed above, provided two complementary
accounts of the dangers that threaten emerging property interests.
176
Demsetz's argument was that as technology changes, so the law of property
must change to protect new cost-benefit possibilities. 177 Levmore's public
choice approach predicted resistance to this change on the part of pre-existing
rights holders. 178 If our theory of the internet anticommons in virtual property
is correct, we should expect to find holders of crosscutting horizontal rights
attempting to take the value of emerging virtual property interests for
themselves.
This is in fact currently happening, and happening in a manner that is
entirely recognizable from this discussion thus far. Private parties usually
create an anticonmons by contract. And, indeed, when we look at the places
where virtual property interests are beginning to strongly emerge, we find
contractual restrictions that explicitly attempt to knock out emergent virtual
property interests.
Virtual environments consist of three-dimensional virtual spaces. The
"stuff' of which virtual environments are made is code that creates a graphical
representation of textures and surfaces. Those textures and surfaces are owned
by the creators of the virtual environment, who have an intellectual property
interest in the environment as a whole.17 9
In order to access virtual environments, the citizens of the environments
must sign contracts (End User License Agreements) with the holders of the
intellectual property rights in the environment. These EULA agreements
disclaim any property interest in anything a user builds or creates. In other
words, the EULA creates a right to exclude on the part of the intellectual
property holder that can be exercised to eliminate emergent virtual property
rights.
One license agreement, recently issued, that governs one of the largest
entertainment-based virtual environments in operation in the United States
176 DEMSETZ, supra note 83, at 107-10; Levmore, supra note 98, at 188.
177 DEMSETZ, supra note 83, at 107 ("Increased internalization... results from changes
in economic values, changes which stem from the development of new technology ... ").
178 Levmore, supra note 98, at 188 ("Technological changes play an important role in
this story as well; a new technology ... might create a powerful new industry, or an existing
interest group might try to fight off a new technology with regulatory hurdles.").
179 See Wikipedia: Virtual World, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtualworld%20 (last
visited Sept. 11, 2005) (describing virtual worlds).
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(current population approximately 2,000,000 world-wide), 80 explains the
position of intellectual property holders succinctly:
7. Selling of Items
Remember, at the outset of these Terms of Use, where we discussed how
you were "licensed" the right to use [the virtual world], and that your
license was "limited"? Well, here is one of the more important areas
where these license limitations come into effect. Note that [the
intellectual property holder] either owns, or has exclusively licensed, all
of the content which appears in [the virtual world]. Therefore, no one has
the right to "sell" [the IP holder's] content, except [the IP holder]! So
[the IP holder] does not recognize any property claims outside of [the
virtual world] or the purported "sale" in the "real world" of anything
related to [the virtual world]. Accordingly, you may not sell items for
"real" money or trade items for things of value outside of [the virtual
world]. 18 1
Not content with protecting its own intellectual property against the
encroachment of emergent virtual property interests, the owner of the
environment claims ownership of all valuable work created by the inhabitants
of the virtual environment as well:
All title, ownership rights and intellectual property rights in and to [the
virtual world] (including but not limited to any user accounts, titles,
computer code, themes, objects, characters, character names, stories,
dialogue, catch phrases, locations, concepts, artwork, animations, sounds,
musical compositions, audio-visual effects, methods of operation, moral
rights, any related documentation, "applets" incorporated into [the virtual
world], transcripts of the chat rooms, member profile information,
recordings of games played in [the virtual world], and software) are
owned by [the IP holder] or its licensors. 182
These provisions surpass the usual abuses of contracts of adhesion. 183 By
means of contract, virtual environment holders currently parlay their
(legitimate) claim to the intellectual property in an environment into an
illegitimate claim to all of the virtual property possessed by or developed by
the inhabitants of the environment.
There is, however, an even stronger argument to be made. To state that such
EULAs presumptively knock out any emergent property rights is to beg the
question: why should we permit consensual agreements that prevent formation
"' See Woodcock, supra note 66.
181 World of Warcraft Terms of Use Agreement,
http://www.worldoftvarcraft.com/legal/termsofuse.shtm (last modified May 5, 2005).
182 Id.
183 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1239, 1240-47 (1995) (discussing the use of shrinkwrap software licenses in the
context of computer software).
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of property rights in the first instance any more than we tolerate other
consensual restraints on alienation? The function of property law is in large
part to resist contractual limitations on property use.184 If the restraint on
alienation limits the property in question to low-value uses, we term it an
unreasonable restraint, and do not enforce it. i8s Thus, property law provides a
rationale and a mechanism for resisting the systematic expropriation of
emergent online property forms by use of contract.
D. Recognition of Virtual Property Will Permit the United States to Compete
with Nascent Regimes in China and Taiwan
If the United States does not recognize a property right that operates at the
level of code, other legal regimes will.186 The United States is behind the
curve in terms of recognizing and protecting virtual property rights. China,
with a population of over 26.3 million people who regularly access virtual
worlds, 187 has already begun to develop law to regulate and protect these
interests as part of its program to attract and build a competitive technology
industry. Taiwan has developed similar statutory protection for virtual
property. Korea, on the other hand, has largely attempted to solve questions of
virtual property through the criminal and antitrust laws, with extremely limited
success.
In a landmark decision, Li Hongchen v. Beijing Arctic Ice Technology
Development Co.,188 the Beijing Second Intermediate Court (famous for its
intellectual property decisions) considered a complaint by a virtual world
inhabitant against the holder of the online environment in a dispute over
ownership of virtual property. 189 The virtual property of Li Hongchen was
taken by a third party when his account was hacked. The lower court
determined that Beijing Arctic Ice had an obligation to restore the property to
its rightful owner.' 90 The court of appeals affirmed the decision, and ordered
184 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 12.
185 See Robinson, supra note 127, at 1480 n.111 ("The common law has invalidated
restraints on alienation in property from time out of mind.") (citing JOHN CHIPMAN,
RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF PROPERTY 2-10 (2d. ed. 1895) (discussing the history of
the doctrine of restraints on alienation)).
186 I am heavily indebted in this section to the research and assistance of Lingyan Peng,
without whom forays into Chinese and Taiwanese law would have been impossible.
187 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
188 The full opinion is available at www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=143455 (last
visited Sept. 11, 2005) (on file with author) (Chinese language website); see also Will
Knight, Gamer Wins Back Virtual Booty in Court Battle, NEWSCIENTIST.COM, Dec. 23,
2003, http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn4510 (discussing the Li Hongchen
case).
189 Id.
190 Id.
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restoration of the property. 19 1 Although the court invoked the principles of
contract in its decision, it did so to protect a distinct property right - the right
of the owner to control the property as against the world, not merely as against
the party who committed a wrongful action (here, the third party). 192 The
action quieted title in virtual property in its rightful owner.
The protection of virtual property has also found its way into the Chinese
criminal law. The Beijing Evening News recently reported the sentencing of
two 17-year-old boys for the theft of virtual property.1 93 Police in Chengdu are
currently investigating the theft of roughly RMB 50,000 worth of virtual
equipment. 194 Numerous other complaints of theft of virtual property have
been filed, and the number of incidents is rising month by month. To assist
police in dealing with this new and rapidly increasing form of theft, the Public
Security Ministry has published an advisory letter on how to punish the theft of
virtual property. 195
These decisions and government actions do not exist in a vacuum. Rather,
they are an integral part of the Chinese government's initiative to build a
competitive virtual world industry. China already possesses a cadre of
professional virtual world vendors: people who sell virtual property for a
living. As of 2004, over 1000 professional sellers of virtual property made
high-end salaries entirely from virtual worlds. 196 China currently has 5,000
producers of the technology underlying virtual worlds, a number it hopes to
quadruple in the next few years. 197 China's underground market in virtual
property is estimated to top RMB 1 billion.198  Measured by online
191 Id.
192 See id.
193 Beijing Evening News, quoted by CHONG XIN (CHINESE NEWS), October 13, 2004,
www.chinanews.com.cn/news/2004/2004-10-13/26/493946.shtml (Chinese language
website). An interesting aspect of many virtual property thefts is that they do not always
result from a hack. Many thefts arise from a simple abuse of trust - akin to someone
stealing your VCR after you invited them into your home. Thus, the laws against hacking
do not cover the necessary ground. Moreover, the laws that cover chattel property, such as
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which limits unauthorized access of a "protected"
computer, also do not protect virtual property, which are by nature persistent on servers not
owned by the owner of the virtual property.
194 See games.sina.com.cn/newgames/2003/12/12019148.shtml (last visited Feb. 26,
2005) (Chinese language website).
195 Id.
196 The salaries ranged above RMB 10,000, or roughly $1,200. The phenomenon is not
limited to China. See Mark Ward, Making Money from Virtually Nothing, BBC NEWS, Aug.
11, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/technology/3135247.stm (describing how virtual
property dealers make money, and describing vendors with six-figure incomes from sales of
virtual property).
197 See Chinese Technological Creation Initiative, supra note 67.
198 See Zang Tingting & Daragh Moller, Legislation Proposed to Protect Virtual
Property, CHINA INTERNET INFO. CTR., January 26, 2004,
10852005]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
subscriptions, the Chinese market was valued at US$159.6 million in 2003.199
Online subscriptions are predicted to grow from $159.7 million in 2003 to
$822.9 million in 2008.200
In late 2004, government and industry specialists convened a conference in
Shanghai to discuss statutes for the regulation and protection of virtual
property. Kou Xiaowei, the Deputy Director-General of the Audio, Visual,
Electronic, and Internet Publishing Department under the General
Administration of Press and Publication, had publicly pressed for protection of
virtual property as a means of incentivizing investment in Chinese-based
virtual worlds. 20 1 In response to this call for protective legislation, groups in
Chengdu have offered draft legislation to the People's Congress that would
protect virtual property.202
Taiwan has followed a similar process in developing a concept of virtual
property. Early issues of virtual property dealt with property in online games,
so the earliest regulations dealt with the entertainment sector. As early as
1997, Taiwanese law protected electronic records under the law of theft.20 3 A
November 23, 2001 Taiwanese regulation promulgated by the Ministry of
Justice expressly stated that virtual objects are property, are alienable and
transferable, that actions on such objects or accounts sound in property, and
that the theft of such property is fully punishable under criminal law:
The account and valuables of online games are stored as electromagnetic
records in the game server. The owner of the [] account is entitled to
control the account and valuables' electromagnetic record, to freely sell
or transfer it. Although the above accounts and valuables are virtual,
they are valuable property in the real world. The players can auction or
transfer them online. The accounts and valuables are the same as the
property in the real world. Therefore, there is no reason not to take the
accounts and valuables of online games to be the subject to be protected
by the larceny or fraud in criminal law.20 4
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2004/Jan/85502.htm (discussing the value of the Chinese
virtual world market).
199 LIANFENG Wu & JuN-Fwu CHIN, INT'L DATA GROUP, CHINA ONLINE GAMING MARKET
SIZING AND FORECAST (2004), available at
www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerld=AP322103L.
200 Id.
201 See USITO China IT Weekly Briefing, October 15, 2004,
www.usito.org/uploads/269/weekly octl5.htm; see also http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2004-10-
10/0745437215.shtml (last visited Feb. 26, 2005) (Chinese language website).
202 See Tingting & Moller, supra note 198.
203 Article 323, Taiwan Criminal Code (1997) (on file with author).
204 Taiwan Ministry of Justice Official Notation No. 039030 (90) (emphasis added) (copy
on file with author). Taiwan Criminal Code Articles 358 and 359 independently punish
misuse of computer resources that cause harm. ("Those who acquire, delete, or change
others' computer, or electronic record of relevant equipment [i.e., virtual property] without
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Critically, the regulation expressly allocates the right to control the
electromagnetic record of the virtual property to the owner of the code object,
not the owner of the server on which the code happens to reside, or the
intellectual property owner of the code. Supporting this ownership right,
Taiwan has also developed a useful and comprehensive body of case law
protecting virtual property from forcible or fraudulent expropriation.
Taiwanese law requires the victim of theft of virtual property to file a police
complaint before prosecution can proceed. 20 5 But even with that caveat,
Taiwanese jurisprudence boasts hundreds of cases on virtual property covering
theft,20 6 fraud, 20 7 and even robbery.20 8 Since 2003, the cause of action of theft
has been revised to include the taking of another's electronic record without
cause.20 9 Prosecutions under this revised statute have become routine.21 0
The development of law governing virtual property in South Korea was
inevitable. South Korea is commonly described as the world's "most wired
society," with the greatest per-capita adoption of broadband connections.
211
The South Korean population is 48 million.212 As of February 1, 2004, 30
cause, causing harm to the public or others, shall be punished with imprisonment of less
than five years, detainment with or without fine of less than NT 200,000") (on file with
author).
205 Prosecutor of the Dep't of the Procurator v. Li Shenxian (Taiwan Taibei District
Court), available at http://nwjirs.judicial.gov.tw/FJUD/index.htm (last visited Feb. 26,
2005) (on file with author) (Chinese language website). In this case, the defendant was
found guilty of stealing the victim's virtual equipment with a value of NT 20,000.
However, the court dismissed the case because the victim did not file a complaint.
206 See, e.g., Prosecutor of the Dep't of the Procurator v. Lin Qunzhi, 82, 777 (Taiwan
Nantou District Court) (finding defendant guilty of cheating the victim into selling him her
virtual equipment) (on file with author).
207 See http://nwjirs.judicial.gov.tw/FJUD/index.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2005) (on file
with author) (Chinese language website).
208 See, e.g., Prosecutor of Dep't of the Procurator v. Xie Junjie, 91, 200 (Taiwan Maoli
District Court), available at http://nwjirs.judicial.gov.tw/FJUD/index.htm (last visited Feb.
26, 2005) (noting that the defendant asked the victim to meet for a transaction, but then
forced the defendant to disclose the password to his account) (on file with author) (Chinese
language website).
209 Prosecutor of Dep't of the Procurator v. Li Shengxian, 93, 440 (Taiwan Taibei
District Court) (on file with author).
210 Prosecutor of Dep't of the Procurator v. Pan Bocun, 93, 440 (Taiwan Banqiao
District Court), available at http://nwjirs.judicial.gov.tv/FJUD/index.htm (last visited Feb.
26, 2005) (on file with author) (Chinese language website). The defendant stole the victim's
virtual equipment, but was not punished because the victim withdrew his complaint. Id.
211 See Mark Russel, Gaming the Online Games, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 18, 2004, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6199780/site/newsweek.
212 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ks.html (last modified August 30, 2005);
Chopin, The Way to Cage People in the Matrix, DDANZI-ILPO (CYNICIsM DAILY), Feb. 1,
2004, at 21 (on file with author).
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million users had accessed the Lineage virtual environments. 213 Over two
million users access Lineage regularly.214 Over forty-one percent of South
Korean teenagers spend significant amounts of time in virtual worlds.215
In the Korean system, complaints about the theft or misappropriation of
virtual property are commonplace. The South Korean experience with virtual
property has therefore been marked by aggressive police enforcement to
protect virtual property interests against hacks and fraud. A recent BBC article
reported that South Korean police received 22,000 cybercrime complaints
related to virtual property in the previous year - over half the total number of
cybercrimes reported in South Korea. 216 A Korean newspaper recently noted
that 10,187 South Korean teenagers were arrested for theft of virtual property
in a single year - over 28 per day.217  These reports are aggressively
prosecuted, resulting in numerous convictions. 218 In light of the property
protections permitted under South Korean criminal law, as convictions climb,
trade in virtual property continues to grow rapidly. 219
However, the Korean experience has a dark side: the lack of explicit
property protection for virtual property has resulted in endless antitrust and
consumer protection litigation against environment creators on the one hand,
and suits seeking injunctions against the sale of virtual property by owners of
virtual property on the other. In 2001, software giant NCSoft successfully
petitioned the Korean government for an executive determination that Clause
16 of its End User License Agreement, which banned ownership in virtual
property, was not a violation of the antitrust laws. 22° Sale of virtual property
remains legal, while ownership remains either ambiguous or located in the
virtual environment creator.221 An advocacy group, the Online Consumers'
Coalition, filed a complaint against NCSoft with South Korea's antitrust
regulatory agency to establish rights in virtual property.222
213 Id. at 21.
214 Id. at 33.
215 Id.
216 Ward, supra note 172.
217 Hwa-Gyung Yoo, Ten Thousand Teenagers "Game Criminals ", MUNWHA-ILPO
(SOUTH KOREAN CULTURAL DAILY), Feb. 27, 2004, at 10 (copy on file with author).
218 See id.
219 Unggi Yoon, Research on Legal Policy of MMORPG-Item Cash Trade (Dec. 13,
2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Unggi Yoon is a judge on the district
court of Pusan, South Korea. Judge Yoon's research examined 480 convictions for theft of
virtual property under South Korea's Enhancement and Protection of Telecommunication
Law, which applies to virtual property theft. Id.
220 See, e.g., Home Page ofUnggi Yoon, http://www.lovol.net (last visited Feb 26, 2005)
(Korean language website). NCSoft is now being investigated for antitrust violations. See
Posting of Dan Hunter to Terranova,
http://terranova.blogs.com/terra_nova/2005/0 l/koreanconsumer.html (Jan. 8, 2005).
221 See Unggi Yoon, supra note 219, at 55.
222 See Hunter, supra note 220.
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We can draw three conclusions from the foregoing analysis of the nascent
Chinese, Taiwanese, and Korean law of virtual property. First, as virtual
property gains currency across the world, the number of people invested in this
kind of property will rise drastically. Second, the law of virtual property
creates serious investment incentives for the inhabitants of virtual worlds, who
will have their choice of legal regimes to govern their property 'as such
structures are created in multiple countries. Finally, as noted from the Korean
example, lobbying by organized industry can be expected to attempt to wipe
out virtual property; if it succeeds, subsequent abuses of the resulting
monopoly position can be expected. The United States should therefore profit
from these comparative examples and craft moderate protections for virtual
property, in order to remain competitive, protect valuable allocations of
resources, and limit the potential for abuse.
223
IV. CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES
Thus far, this article has shown that much important code mimics real world
objects and spaces by design; that the common law of property offers insights
into the value of private property; and that an account of a property
anticommons explains why a system akin to the common law of property
would do a better job than intellectual property of regulating virtual property.
This section will discuss several challenges to the virtual property model.
One criticism is so important that it must be addressed up front. A common
criticism leveled at the theory of virtual property is that there is no "there"
there. That is, there is nothing tangible for us to talk about, so property law
cannot apply.
However, the legal existence of property rights has little to do with
tangibility. An interest in a timeshare, or in airspace is intangible. The right to
kill this beaver but not that one is intangible. The law of property has not shied
away from recognizing rights in bank account numbers, personal
characteristics, or in developing news stories - all intangibles. 224 Property law
is an allocation system that solves certain problems. If those efficiency
problems exist online, they can be potentially resolved by applying the insights
of property law. Moreover, even though the resources discussed here are
intangible, by design they have characteristics of tangibility: rivalrousness,
223 Additionally, there is a concern that dispute selection will skew the law in this area.
Thus far, the only case filed in a major virtual property dispute, Mythic Entertainment v.
Black Snow Interactive, was dropped prior to trial for failure to prosecute by the virtual
property holder. See David Becker, Game Exchange Dispute Goes to Court, CNET, Feb. 7,
2002, http://ecoustics-cnet.com.com/Game+exchange+dispute+goes+to+court/2 100-
10403-832347.html.
224 Ward, supra note 172 ("It's certainly possible to steal intangible property. It's
possible to steal any form of property right which is not represented by tangible objects ....
In law a bank account is a credit balance. It's not a pile of money .. ") (quoting Dr.
Robert Leng, University of Warwick).
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persistence, and interconectivity. To the extent that virtual property shares
the legally relevant characteristics of real world property, it is not a stretch to
state that common law property values may have valuable insights to
contribute to the regulation and protection of online use rights.
The following sections address three additional sets of challenges: (1)
criticisms from economics; (2) criticisms from law; and (3) criticisms from the
technology industry that creates virtual environments.
A. Criticisms from Economics
An economist might ask, so what? All that is being said here is that certain
uses of virtual "property" are devalued because you have to buy a license
rather than hold a use right in some form of online fee simple. Why won't
people just pay less for the fewer uses that they do get? After all, each of the
virtual objects and environments I describe already exist, and people are
already sinking huge amounts of money into property-like use rights on the
internet. ICANN is a (moderate) success. 225  Virtual environments have
inhabitants numbering in the tens of millions. Isn't this a success story?
The "discount" theory is not a strong criticism because the costs imposed by
the failure to recognize virtual property are transaction costs, not merely value
allocated between the parties. Transaction costs (or, if the deal does not go
through, deadweight loss) are pure social waste. Failure to recognize virtual
property raises both negotiation and search costs for third parties.
226
Idiosyncratic contractual burdens on property require third parties to engage in
expensive searches of the contractual limitations that burden their proposed
purchase. 227  And the existence of idiosyncratic contractual burdens on
property not only hampers one transaction, but every transaction, because
buyers will have to ensure that an idiosyncratic burden does not appear in their
particular purchase. 228 Thus, the costs of contractual and non-standard burdens
on property extend beyond the immediate transaction, and raise transaction
costs across the board.229 Turning to negotiation costs, we again see that
resources could be locked into low-value uses if parties exercise overlapping
rights to exclude.230 In Demsetz's terminology, there is always a threat that
pre-existing rights holders will block an emergent property form, not because
they wish to make use of it themselves, but because they worry that the
emergent right might threaten their immediate profit.
231
225 See discussion supra Part III.B.
226 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 12, at 7-10.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 26-27.
229 Id. at 27-30.
230 Heller, supra note 13, at 629-30.
231 DEMSETZ, supra note 83, at 107-10.
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B. Criticisms from Law
The possible challenges grounded in legal thought are too many to be dealt
with succinctly; several of the most important are discussed here. The first
criticism addressed is institutional, and questions why common-law courts,
rather than legislatures, ought to deal with threats to emergent virtual property
interests. The second is practical, and asks why we need a system of property,
when contract might be a valid substitute. The third is philosophical, and
discusses the argument that legal reasoning about property is essentially
transcendental nonsense. The fourth criticism draws from rights-based
discourse, and deals with the idea that propertization might conflict with other
valuable rights - such as the freedom to speak - that exist online.
1. Institutional Arguments: Why Common Law Courts Should
Adjudicate Emergent Virtual Property Interests
An important challenge to my analysis is why and whether it is necessary to
turn to the common law at all. After all, if some forms of this problem are
solvable by statute, why not lobby Congress, or state legislatures, to enact rules
that limit anticommons problems in internet intangibles?
Whether virtual property is protected by common law or by statute is, in the
main, unimportant. Perhaps the law will evolve first as a function of the
common law, and after due reflection, as statute. But in the meantime, we still
live in a common law regime, and in the absence of statute, courts must decide
disputes. It would be an abdication for a court to refuse to adjudicate a virtual
property claim merely because no statute exists. Thus, common-law analysis of
these questions is not optional. Cases applying property law to the internet are
an increasing and increasingly important phenomenon. 232 To decide these
cases, as applied to what is admittedly a foreign medium, courts should have a
clear grounding in what property law will do in virtual spaces. Moreover, as
we have discovered, virtual property problems are handled quite nicely by
rules that courts are already familiar with. Thus, there is an argument from
institutional competence despite the fact that courts often consider themselves
intruders in virtual spaces.
There is an even stronger argument for resolving questions of use
allocations on the internet by reference to the common law of property.
Contract and property have evolved to balance each other. The law of contract
permits parties to realize the value of idiosyncratic and personalized utility in
the form of trades. The law of property restricts that ability insofar as it locks
232 See, e.g., eBay v. Bidder's Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (enjoining
defendant from using an automated querying program that aggregated information from
plaintiff's web site based on trespass); CompuServe v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp.
1015, 1022 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (holding that defendant's sending of spare to plaintiff's system
after plaintiff demanded that the defendant cease constituted a trespass to private property);
Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 299-300 (Cal. 2003) (declining to find an action in tort
for trespass to chattels based on defendant's mass emailing to plaintiffs email system).
10912005]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
high-value property into low-value uses. Thus, the question of "why apply the
common law of property to the internet?" makes about as much sense as the
question "why apply the common law of contract to the internet?" The answer
is that both are needed.
Finally, there is little reason to think that the United States will reach an
effective legislative solution to the virtual property problem, because the
intellectual property lobby has proven deeply effective. Under the public
choice version of events, most clearly expressed by Saul Levmore, pre-existing
rights holders should be expected to lobby institutions for laws that take or
stifle emerging property values.2 33 Intellectual property holders have proven
experienced lobbyists - especially as relates to the shifting cost-benefit
possibilities of the internet. Congress's perennial extension of copyright, and
its expansion of private subpoena capacity to force ISPs to breach the
anonymity of users, are just two examples.234 In the virtual property context,
such lobbying efforts are already underway.235 When an identifiable, small,
and wealthy group (like the holders of intellectual property) seeks legislative
action against a disorganized, inchoate, and dispersed majority, the former can
be confidently expected to prevail in the legislature. Thus, to the extent that
these rights will emerge in the United States, they will probably do so as a
function of the decisions of the courts.236
2. Contract Arguments: Why Contract Is Not an Adequate Alternative
Route to Achieving the Benefits of Property Protection
Another common objection to a theory of virtual property is that it is
unnecessary because contracts are available to allocate the benefits of the
resources between a user and the creator of a virtual environment. But, just
like the "discount" argument above, this objection misses the point entirely.
Contracts only allocate costs and benefits between the parties to the contract.
Property law balances the benefits of personalized transactions against the
search costs imposed on third parties seeking to purchase such resources.
Thus, for example, if person A agrees, by contract, to let person B use his
wristwatch on Monday mornings, all other prospective purchasers of
wristwatches must now be on the lookout for Monday-morning use
agreements.2 37 Their costs go up.
233 See Levmore, supra note 98, at 188-91.
234 See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998).
235 Software giant NCSoft has petitioned the government of Korea to eliminate virtual
property rights by statute. See, e.g., Posting of Dan Hunter to Terranova,
http://terranova.blogs.com/terra-nova/2004/04/china-virtual-p.html (Apr. 28, 2004); Home
Page of Unggi Yoon, supra note 220.
236 It is perhaps telling that China, which lacks a developed intellectual property lobby
(perhaps as a result of the failure to enforce against pirates, although cause and effect are
difficult to determine), has provided extensive protection to virtual property interests.
237 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 12, at 26-27.
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It is important not to take this argument too far, as justifying a repudiation of
all contracts because of higher search costs for third parties. Rather, the goal is
a balance between the frustration costs involved in not allowing people to
create individualized transactions, and the search costs imposed on third parties
by governing high-value resources by contract. 238 This balance cannot be
accomplished by a regime of contract alone.
Second, and similarly, the law of contract is ill-suited to enabling
downstream sales. Under such a system, a potential downstream buyer would
hold their "property" pursuant to a chain of bilateral contracts, or sub-sub-
sublicenses. This would be a return to full subinfeudation - the practice of
requiring a personal relationship between the buyer and original rights-holder
in land, which was the hallmark of the feudal property system. 23 9 If a
prospective buyer of any property - virtual or otherwise - is required to check
the terms of each upstream contract to which the object has been subjected,
search costs again rise.24 0
3. Legal/Philosophical Arguments: Property as Transcendental Nonsense
There is another challenge that relates to all legal theories of property. The
challenge is that legal reasoning consists of transcendental nonsense intended
to justify the actions of courts. 24' Under this conception, the idea that
something is "property" because it has value is entirely circular - after all, if a
court were to not protect it, it would have no value, and would not be
property. 242 As Felix S. Cohen explained in his critique of trademark law:
The circularity of legal reasoning ... is veiled by the "thingification" of
property. Legal language portrays courts as examining commercial
words and finding, somewhere inhering in them, property rights. It is by
virtue of the property right which the plaintiff has acquired... that he is
entitled to an injunction or an award of damages. According to the
recognized authorities[,] ... courts are not creating property, but are
merely recognizing a pre-existent Something.243
Certainly, Cohen's criticism seems damning to this project, which is an
unabashed attempt at reification - "thingifying" a class of resources so that
they may be efficiently traded and used. The intangibility and emergent nature
of virtual property make it especially vulnerable to arguments that any attempt
to describe its "existence" is philosophical nonsense.
238 See id. at 38. ("From a social point of view, the objective should be to minimize the
sum of measurement (and error) costs, frustration costs, and administrative costs.").
239 See Robinson, supra note 127, at 1480 n.1 11 (discussing costs of subinfeudation).
240 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 12, at 26-27.
241 See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REv. 809, 820 (1935).
242 Id. at 815.
243 Id. (emphasis in original).
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This article does indeed describe what virtual property is so that it may be
identified, sold, and protected. But by defining the project of this piece, it is
saved from being Cohen-style Nonsense. Virtual property ought not to be
protected merely because it is property - although that is true, it is indeed
circular. Rather, virtual property ought to be protected because it represents
the best way of splitting up use rights so as to cause people to use it efficiently.
That is a different "because". Recognizing that a set of use rights creates
efficient use incentives, and thus that the best set of use rights ought to be
packaged, protected, and sold, is a reason for the protection of property that
operates by reference to how humans act.
Cohen explicitly recognizes this when he establishes a theory of
functionalism, which examines the effects of legal regimes rather than their
legal "essence":
If courts, for instance, should prevent a man from breathing any air which
had been breathed by another (within, say, a reasonable statue of
limitations), those individuals who breathed most vigorously and were
quickest and wisest in selecting desirable locations in which to breathe (or
made the most advantageous contracts with such individuals) would, by
virtue of their property right in certain volumes of air, come to exercise
and enjoy a peculiar economic advantage .... 244
Cohen's arguments therefore strongly support this article's project: rather
than focusing on formalist conceptions of property (usually expressed in the
argument that virtual property cannot be property because it "isn't real"), this
article considers the effect the laws have on the incentives of people to make
productive use of the resources.
Finally, the reification proposed in this article is not the creation of a
separate legal regime. Rather, it is an argument that courts ought to apply
common-law property doctrines to certain online resources, because people
will make better use of those resources if they are packaged in a given fashion.
The law of property has often resisted creating new forms of legal rights - for
example, temporally fragmented rights like condominiums took a long time to
develop (although, eventually, they did).245 But the law of property has never
shied from protecting emergent cost-benefit possibilities for resources
developed by technology - as new ways to use resources are created by
technology, the common law has stepped in and given the emergent cost-
benefit possibility the time to find its feet in the form of a political
constituency that will protect it from agency influence.246
244 Id. at 816.
245 See, e.g., Mark D. West & Emily Morris, The Tragedy of the Condominiums: Legal
Responses to Collective Action Problems After the Kobe Earthquake, 51 AM. J. COMP. L.
903, 904 (2003) (describing condominium property in general and its effects on collective
action problems).
246 See, e.g., Kurt M. Saunders, A Crusade in the Public Domain: The Dastar Decision,
30 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 161, 176 (2004) (discussing this concept in the context
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4. Rights-Based Discourse: Property and Freedom of Speech
A final challenge to the model of virtual property is the claim that property
interests on the internet threaten valuable "rights." This challenge usually is
raised in the context of free speech values. 247 The fear is that if the internet
becomes privatized, then the owner of private property may prevent others
from speaking on certain topics. 248 But this question does not apply to virtual
property, because the argument conflates physical chattel interests - which
may, if permitted, impermissibly generate controls on internet speech by
denying access to the architecture of the internet itself - with virtual interests.
As discussed above, the threat to free speech is the use of a physical chattel
right to exercise control over all of the internet traffic that passes through the
chattel. The threat to free speech posed by virtual property is more akin to the
right to not be contacted in one's own house - much less corrosive than a
censorship right over the means of communication.
Furthermore, interests in virtual property can enhance freedom of speech as
well as restrict it.249 If speakers have web pages on which they can publish
what they like (subject to defamation laws), then they can communicate their
ideas. To take up the Hamidi case again, the problem was not that Hamidi
could not speak: under the rubric of FACE-Intel (his group challenging Intel's
employment policies), Hamidi could create a website and speak to fellow
disgruntled employees. 250 The problem was that he wanted to use Intel's email
of unpatented boat hull designs and the Supreme Court's decision in Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989)).
247 I use the term "free speech values," rather than discussing the First Amendment
directly, because the actors are generally private when an owner of private property
exercises legal rights to silence someone else from speaking on or through his property.
While a claim that a state's complicity in permitting a cause of action to suppress speech
(here a property cause, whereas famously in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), an action for defamation) might be successful, generally state action would be quite
difficult to prove. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 455 (2d
Cir. 2001) (holding that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act was not an unconstitutional
restriction of free speech).
248 For an excellent discussion of speech issues in virtual worlds, see Jack M. Balkin,
Law and Liberty in Virtual Worlds, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 63, 73 (2005).
249 See Balkin, supra note 248, at 63 ("[Mlany virtual worlds are becoming sites of real
world and virtual worlds commerce .... To the extent that spaces are designed for and
encourage buying and selling of real and virtual goods, the First Amendment will not shield
game designers .... ).
250 See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 317-18 (Cal. 2003). There are other
constraints as well. A company that squelches criticism while only permitting positive
content may run afoul of the securities laws, just as boiler-room statements that raise stock-
price are subject to enforcement. This dynamic most often plays out in chat rooms, as part
of the SLAPP (strategic litigation against public participation) phenomenon of the dot-bust,
during which companies sued posters to stock chat rooms in the hope of stopping criticism
of the management. Such strategies have generally not been successful for the companies,
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accounts to do it. If other people are entitled to stop me from speaking on their
virtual "real estate," conversely, I am able to say what I like on mine. It is not
clear, therefore, that using a private property paradigm on the net significantly
decreases the ability to communicate ideas.251 At the least, it may increase the
ability of people to make statements on their own property (which is accessible
by the world if they wish it) as much or more than it decreases their ability to
speak against infrastructure owners.
5. The Role of Intellectual Property in Virtual Property
One extremely important caveat: recognition of virtual property rights does
not mean the elimination of intellectual property. The owner of virtual
property does not own the right to copy it. We understand instinctually and
logically that ownership of a thing is always separate from ownership of the
intellectual property embedded in a thing. Ownership of a book is not
ownership of the intellectual property of the novel that the author wrote. The
book purchaser owns the physical book, nothing more. Ownership of a CD is
not ownership of the intellectual property in the music. The music purchaser
owns that copy of the music, nothing more. In precisely the same fashion,
ownership of virtual property does not threaten the intellectual property
interest held by the creator of the property. It protects the interests of the
purchaser of the object. An owner of virtual property owns the same rights
that the owner of a book does.
Thus, intellectual property need not conflict with virtual property. In fact,
the two, if well-balanced, will complement each other. We already have very
successful regimes balancing these interests. The first-sale doctrine, for
example, minimizes transaction costs by building the value of future sales into
the cost of the item the first time it is sold.252 Thus, the creator of the
intellectual property cheaply realizes all of the potential value of future sales of
its intellectual property without having to monitor a long chain of potential
and it is my sense that this constraint operates over any attempt to restrain what people say
to criticize a company. Note, however, that not even the SLAPP cases say that the
defendant had a right to use the company's own equipment to spread the dissenting view.
See Joshua R. Furman, Cybersmear or Cyber-SLAPP: Analyzing Defamation Suits Against
Online John Does as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 25 SEATTLE UNIV. L.
R. 213, 253 (2001).
251 This analysis does not solve the problem of content regulation by backbone
communicators. But given the packet-switching decentralized nature of the flow of
information over the system, a decision by an infrastructure contributor to block would be
unsuccessful. Moreover, an infrastructure provider blocking data would likely cause
common carrier litigation that, my sense is, the infrastructure owner would lose. But the
emergence of common carrier law does not obviate private property; it modifies it in a
limited circumstance.
252 See R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44
B.C. L. REv. 577 (2003) (arguing that technology alters the first-sale calculus where easy
duplication alters the affordability and availability calculi).
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downstream sales. Similarly, virtual property will raise the value of
intellectual property. Take the example of websites: clear-cut rights in
websites have fostered serious commercial investment in content for the
websites. That obviously benefits creators of content. Similarly, real estate in
a virtual world has real value, in that the creator of the software that generates
the virtual world underlying the virtual real estate will profit. Thus, the value
of intellectual property is not a reason to discard virtual property rights.
C. Criticisms from Industry
While the question of virtual property is an emerging topic for the law, it is
an established and longstanding problem for industry designers.25 3 There are
three basic arguments from industry. The first is that environment creators
must maintain control over the environment, and that the need for such control
is incompatible with private property interests.25 4  The second is that
commodification of virtual objects will corrode other values - like the
enjoyment of games - that people find valuable.255  The third is that
propertization threatens community values. 25 6 The following sections address
these arguments from control, commodification, and community in turn.
1. The Argument from Control Is Not Persuasive Because the Need for
Control Does Not Require the Prohibition of Property Interests
The first criticism from industry is the argument that ownership interests in
virtual property limit the industry's ability to control the online resources they
manage.257 Thus, for example, an ISP might argue that a property right in
email accounts would overly constrain its ability to stop people from engaging
in bad acts via the ISP's email services. Virtual world holders often argue that
their need to develop and expand the virtual environment necessitates locking
out private property interests. 258
Commentators often use the problem of speculation in virtual property as a
way of expressing the control argument.259 What happens if the actions of the
environment holder in some way damage or devalue the virtual object in which
253 See Richard A. Bartle, Virtual Worldliness: What the Imaginary Asks of the Real, 49
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 19 (2005) (describing industry design standards for virtual worlds). Dr.
Bartle is one of the fathers of modem virtual worlds, having designed the early text-based
virtual environments.
254 See Richard A. Bartle, Bartle of Virtual Property 9-11 (The Themis Group April
2004), available at
http://www.themis-group.com/uploads/Bartle%20of3/o20Virtual%20Property.pdf.
255 See Bartle, supra note 253, at 16, 23-25.
256 Bartle, supra note 254, at 13-15; Bartle, supra note 253, at 23-25.
257 Bartle, supra note 254, at 9-10.
258 Id. at 9.
259 Id. at 9-10 (arguing that virtual property would render virtual world holders liable for
obsolescence).
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a user holds a property interest?260  For example, after parties invest in
valuable virtual real estate, the environment developer might create new virtual
real estate in which rival commercial hubs are built. Or, another example: if a
given virtual object carries a social cachet due to its rarity, such that possession
of the virtual object is desired, would the developer be liable if the rarity of the
object changed? Finally, what about pulling the plug - industry's fear is that
the creator of a virtual world would be somehow required to maintain that
virtual world in perpetuity because of still-existing property on its servers.261
But these questions are not new to the law, nor do they inevitably lead to
liability for virtual world creators. Speculation in land, for example, is not
always a wise return: new developments can always devalue prior investments.
Any owner of a shopping mall knows the threat of a newer establishment.
Real estate developers, however, are not constrained - absent contractual non-
competition clauses - from building competing real estate by virtue of the fact
that they sold prior ones. Manufacturers artificially limit or expand supply of
goods all the time, knowing that the resulting changes in value due to scarcity
will affect prior purchasers. Zoning laws routinely take away from or enhance
the value of property without compensation to or payment from the owner.
Pulling the plug on a virtual world certainly deprives the inhabitants of the
value of their holdings, but in no greater fashion than bankruptcy deprives
equity holders of the value of their stock: this is not a reason to eliminate
private property holdings in stocks. Even the strongest case for control - that
of government - cannot justify the prohibition of private property. Imagine if
a state government argued that its need to secure an orderly public life
compelled it to abolish private property.
The need to foster development, limit speculation, control losses of property
holders, or secure public life do not each vitiate the value of private property,
and the efficiencies private property engenders. These principles may provide
some limits to rights in virtual property - as they do to real property - but that
is the most they can do. The criticism from control does not justify eliminating
private virtual property rights entirely.
Moreover, managers are not required to give up all hope of usefully
managing the resources if property rights in virtual property are recognized.
Private ownership has never meant complete freedom from control, even from
other private entities. Use restrictions in the form of easements and covenants
have always been available for managers of property plots that are divided
among private owners. Further, some restrictions on virtual property are
unlikely to be resisted, since they will increase the value of each person's
holdings. Like a real estate subdivision, a virtual property holder may receive
some return on the restriction in their use of the property. For example, many
260 Id. at 10.
261 This has already occurred. On the day that a person purchased $3,000 worth of
virtual property from another user on eBay, Electronic Arts pulled the plug on Earth and
Beyond, an entertainment-oriented virtual world. See id. at 12.
1098 [Vol. 85:1047
VIRTUAL PROPERTY
homeowners' associations forbid their members to hang their wash out on the
line, which increases the value of each member's property. The key is that the
property rights are not absolute and can be modified, both in the virtual and
real space contexts.
2. The Argument from Commodification Is Not Persuasive Because the
Items in Question Are Already Commodities
Commodification is less of an issue for virtual property, such as email
addresses, URLs, etc., that are not bound up in tightly-knit social groups. But
it is important not to dismiss the commodification argument too easily. Many
virtual worlds have a sense of distance from the real world - and that is
precisely what people in these virtual worlds enjoy. The fear of these small
internet communities is that commodification would corrode other values that
virtual world denizens enjoy. 262
The argument generally states that commodification by itself cheapens the
object commodified.263 For example, studies comparing the blood donation
market in the United Kingdom (where such donations are non-compensated),
to similar markets in the United States (where compensation for donation is
permitted) showed that there were costs to commodification. 264 Blood giving
dropped when people perceived it as an economic activity, rather than a
donative activity.265
This sort of argument works when there is commodification of a previously
non-commercial source, like body parts, or blood. The idea is that the
commodification not only cheapens the new commodity, but also imposes
costs on related objects (i.e., if sale of blood is accepted, sale of transplanted
organs or children may follow). 2 66 However, the slippery slope argument fails
to the extent that the objects dealt with are already commodities. The virtual
objects discussed here - virtual houses, tools, clothes, etc. - are already
commodities. They are the objects of encouraged intra-world trade.
262 See id. at 16.
263 There is a third form of argument, which focuses on the threat real world laws (like
taxes) pose to the fun of games. See, e.g., Edward Castronova, The Right to Play, 49 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 185 (2005). I do not focus on this objection, since it is not really an argument
from commodification, except to note that the law has not had a hard time dealing with
economic gains from games. Generally, the rule is that if a poker player, football player, or
vendor of virtual property cashes out his gains in the form of real cash, he should tell the
IRS.
264 See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 1856
(1987).
265 Id. at 1913-14.
266 See, e.g., Michele Goodwin, Altruism's Limits: Law, Capacity, and Organ
Commodification, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 305, 318 (2004) ("According to a cadre of market
opponents, permitting organ sales is akin to allowing commercial forces to dictate the value
of human flesh .... An open market in organ sales, they suggest, would lead to unpleasant
collateral results....").
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Commodification has already occurred in the most important sense - virtual
property is already packaged so as to be usefully traded. Validating the
already tacitly accepted practice of exchanging real world currency for virtual
objects is unlikely to do more damage.2 67
3. The Argument that Virtual Property Threatens Online Communities
Begs the Question as to Whether We Should Improve Communities by
Lock-In Effects
Another argument is that private property threatens community values in
online communities, and ought to be prohibited as a result.268 Indeed, property
interests do give people an option of exit (i.e., they could cash out their interest
and leave the environment); conversely, blocking property interests is a way to
lock people into communities. But it is not at all clear that the right of exit
provided by propertization is a bad thing.
Property theorists have noted that early "colony-style" groups often prohibit
private property in land. Robert Ellickson wrote of communal property
arrangements in Hutterites, Kibbutzim, Mormons, and early American pioneer
settlements. 269 Each of these small colonization communities (of under 1,000
residents) initially experimented with negating private property in favor of
communitarian ideals.270 The concept was that everyone on the expedition was
"in it together," while the returns from the colonization were unclear at the
outset.271 Under circumstances such as colonization, where the eventual gains
made by the group could not be apportioned ahead of time, Ellickson argued
that such forms of property ownership might even be optimal as a crude form
of insurance. 272
The parallel to the colonization of virtual space is startling. The specific
experience of a virtual community has been likened to a community property
interest.2 73 In order to protect this community interest, private property is,
initially, prohibited. 274 But as small groups expand and become connected to
other groups, social controls (in the examples provided by Ellickson, the
Hutterite religious credos, or the specific secular ideology of the kibbutzim)
267 See Interview with Steve Salyer, supra note 72 (discussing the practice of virtual
world creators in tacitly permitting trades).
26 See Bartle, supra note 253, at 24-26 (arguing that the need to protect community
values requires and justifies the ability to obliterate accounts and characters at the
environment creator's will).
269 Ellickson, supra note 27, at 1346.
270 Id. at 1346-47.
271 Id. at 1354-60.
272 Id. at 1341-44.
273 Castronova, supra note 263, at 186 ("The essence of the argument is that the play-
status of a virtual world is a common property resource, and is therefore subject to long-run
erosion effects (the 'Tragedy of the Commons').").
274 Id. at 187-89.
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become attenuated. 275 One of the most important such social controls, in
Ellickson's communities, was a rule against private property, which
constrained exit.276 Just so with virtual worlds now, where the restrictions on
alienation of virtual property limit exit and reinforce strong top-down control
by virtual world designers. 277 In addition, the early insurance benefits of
communitarianism in a colony-style enterprise are replaced by the value of
selling to markets as the gains from the colony are realized in the form of
developed property. 278 If Ellickson's predictions hold true, what we are
currently observing in virtual worlds is the natural movement from the
communitarian/entrepreneurial model to the private property model.
This article does not advance the claim that nothing is lost in the shift from
community to private property models. Likely something is. But it is
important to realize that an overarching system of private property does permit
communal property groups to continue to exist, if the community is able to
make its social controls stick. The contrary is not true: the elimination of
private property leaves, by definition, no room for private property.
D. The Objections from Economics, Law, and Industry Do Not Convincingly
Support the Prohibition of Private Property
The challenges from economics, law, and industry - although important -
do not eliminate the efficiency gains of regulating virtual property under the
common law of property. A property approach will lower search and
negotiation costs, and will generate social wealth and create incentives to use
important online resources well. Further, the common law of property is an
already-developed institution with which courts are familiar. Once courts
realize that they already have the tools to recognize and protect virtual
property, they will do so following the incremental, iterative process of the
common law. This process will have the additional benefit of protecting
emergent rights in property against interest group lobbying by intellectual
275 Ellickson, supra note 27, at 1352-54. Ellickson delineates the strict social controls
necessary to preserve communitarian values in property. These are strikingly similar to the
following statement of the practice of such controls:
I knew that people might break the unwritten rules that protected the virtual world
from the real one. Some indeed did so. Individually, they were usually easy to deal
with; I would speak to them and explain the problem: it was unfair to the other players
if they behaved however they were behaving, and please would they stop. Most
understood and obliged. Those that did not were reminded that... I could therefore
obliterate [their account] entirely if I so chose. Some, very few, I did obliterate
entirely.
Bartle, supra note 253, at 24 (footnotes omitted).
276 Ellickson, supra note 27, at 1352-54.
277 See Noveck, supra note 57, at 5 ("Must the creators [of virtual worlds] be free to
reign within the confines of the virtual world, or should the law prevail over the virtual
leviathan?").
278 Ellickson supra note 27, at 1354.
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property holders until the beneficiaries of virtual property become choate and
self-aware enough to defend their interests independently.
The standard industry arguments against virtual property are not convincing.
Control of virtual property is possible without prohibiting private property
interests. Commodification is not a threat because the virtual objects concerned
are already commodities. Finally, the argument that virtual property threatens
online communities begs the question: should we lock people into
communities to improve their incentives to get along with other people in the
community, or should we permit people to sell their property as a right of exit
and leave for other communities in which they might be more comfortable?
CONCLUSION
Property law has had a decade-long problematic relationship with
cyberspace. Although the language is full of descriptions of cyber-"space,"
chat "rooms," virtual "worlds," and internet "addresses," legal academics have
consistently rejected these descriptions as having no useful content. And while
the place and space language is routinely used by courts and lawyers, again,
legal academics have either supported the place metaphor as merely
psychologically useful, or have completely rejected it as a bad analogy.
I propose a different answer: cyberspace is neither a bad analogy nor a
metaphor. Cyberspace is a descriptive term. It describes the degree to which
some kinds of code act like spaces or objects. Taking this approach frees us to
apply the developed body of property law to assist in solving inefficient
allocations of rights on the internet. It also provides us with a useful tool for
separating the intellectual property interest from the property interest in code.
And finally, it provides a useful tool for restraining abuses of contract online.
However, getting virtual property right is not important solely because of
efficiency concerns. This kind of property is also very important to develop
for the social, medical, commercial, and cultural changes it can allow. Virtual
worlds are fully contextualized social software with the ability to communicate
information to humans far faster than the world wide web. We began this
change when the telephone was replaced by the internet. We will finish it
when we protect the building blocks of virtual worlds.
1102 [Vol. 85:1047
